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REASONING ABOUT THE IRRATIONAL: THE ROBERTS 
COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
H. Jefferson Powell* 
Abstract: Commentary on the future direction of the Roberts Court generally falls along 
lines that correlate with the commentators’ political views on the desirability of the Court’s 
recent decisions. A more informative approach is to look for opinions suggesting changes in 
the presuppositions with which the Justices approach constitutional decision making. In 
footnote 27 in his opinion for the Court in the District of Columbia v. Heller Second 
Amendment decision, Justice Scalia suggested a fundamental revision of the Court’s 
assumptions about the role of judicial doctrine, and the concept of rationality, in 
constitutional law. Justice Scalia would eliminate the normative aspects of the Court’s 
inquiry into rationality, and reject altogether the generally accepted view that rationality 
review is a deliberate underenforcement of a constitutional norm of substantive reasonability, 
primarily implemented by the legislature. Footnote 27 cites Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion 
in Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, which adopts a similar view of rationality 
as free of normative content. The common threads linking footnote 27, the Engquist opinion, 
and a debate between Justices Alito and Breyer in McDonald v. City of Chicago this past 
June, suggest that footnote 27 is a significant clue to the fundamental understanding of 
constitutional law that commands at least a plurality on the current Court. If this 
understanding becomes dominant, it will profoundly change the Court’s treatment of 
precedent, rational-basis scrutiny, and the role of the political branches in constitutional law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Disagreement over the proper direction of constitutional law is as old 
as the Republic. At present, however, it isn’t clear to many which 
direction—right or wrong—the United States Supreme Court is taking 
constitutional law. On the one hand, the editorial board of the New York 
Times spoke for a host of other critics in complaining that “the Roberts 
[C]ourt demonstrated its determination to act aggressively to undo 
aspects of law it found wanting, no matter the cost.”1 By “the Roberts 
[C]ourt,” the editors meant what they described as a five-Justice 
“conservative majority [that] made clear that it is not done asserting 
itself” on issues of grave national importance,2 perhaps including the 
constitutionality of health-care reform. From the perspective of these 
commentators, the Roberts Court has “come of age” and “entered an 
assertive and sometimes unpredictable phase,” in which (despite the 
occasional surprise) the majority Justices are “fearless” in exerting their 
                                                     
* Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. I wish to 
thank Chip Lupu, Sarah Powell, Peter Smith, and James Boyd White, who provided valuable 
comments and criticism for which I am grateful. 
1. Editorial, The Court’s Aggressive Term, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2010, at A16. The Times’ editors, 
to be sure, grudgingly conceded that it had not been “a thoroughly disappointing term,” but few 
readers will have doubted the editors’ fundamental agreement with other, less nuanced critiques of 
the Court. 
2. Id. 
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power to advance the politically conservative (pro-business, pro-gun, 
anti-criminal defendant) interests Chief Justice Roberts favors.3 Elena 
Kagan’s succession to the seat of retiring Justice John Paul Stevens, on 
this view, was at best a holding action against the Court’s complete 
takeover by the Right. 
On the other hand, the admirers of the Court’s decisions generally 
insist that the critics are vastly overstating both the ideological content 
of the Court’s judgments and the aggressiveness of the Justices who 
usually make up the majority in highly ideological, divided decisions. 
This error of analysis was quite deliberate, and the tale of political 
takeover was “all such tedious sophistry” by the Left, a dishonest 
demonization of Justices whose decisions were marked by caution and 
attention to the specific demands of the judicial process.4 
The identity of the current Court, on this view, is shaped more by 
circumstance than ideology, and by the Justices’ lawyerly approach to its 
role. As Jonathan Adler argued, “The Roberts Court is a work in 
progress, and the change in Court personnel will introduce new 
dynamics, as will a different combination of cases and issues that come 
before the Court. . . . [A]t present, we can characterize the Roberts Court 
as a moderately conservative minimalist Court . . . .”5 
No reader was surprised to notice that critics of an aggressively 
ideological Roberts Court are to the left of center in terms of American 
politics, or that admirers of a judicially modest majority are equally 
likely to occupy positions to the political center’s right. Those are 
precisely the positions of criticism or apologetics that one would expect, 
given contemporary politics and the contemporary Court. In itself, this 
correlation between the politics of commentators and their perceptions 
of the Court proves nothing: either the liberal critique or the 
conservative apologetics might actually be warranted by the Court’s 
actions, even if there are political or sociological explanations for the 
                                                     
3. Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court Comes of Age, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/us/30scotus.html (quoting Lisa S. Blatt on the Justices’ 
fearlessness). 
4. See Ann Althouse, “[T]he Roberts Court Demonstrated its Determination to Act Aggressively 
to Undo Aspects of Law it Found Wanting, No Matter the Cost.”, ALTHOUSE (July 5, 2010, 10:13 
AM), http://althouse.blogspot.com/2010/07/roberts-court-demonstrated-its.html. 
5. Jonathan H. Adler, Making Sense of the Supreme Court, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 2, 
2010, 9:58 AM), http://volokh.com/2010/07/02/making-sense-of-the-supreme-court/. Like the 
Times’ editors, Adler noted that it would be wrong to treat the Court’s decisions as monolithic, in 
his case by qualifying his “moderately conservative minimalist” characterization of the majority: 
“(except when [it’s] not).” 
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views the observers espouse.6 The consistency with which the individual 
observer’s analysis tracks his or her political views, however, does 
suggest that we are unlikely to make jurisprudential sense of “the 
Roberts Court,” or more precisely of the law announced by the Court’s 
current working majority in divisive cases, if we let our analyses move 
too quickly to the bottom line issues of political, economic, and moral 
significance to the Court’s decisions. The outcomes simply matter too 
much—to most of us and to the Justices—and the demonstrable 
ideological content of the cases is reflected, isomorphically, in the 
demonstrable ideological slant of the commentators’ analyses. As a 
result, much of what has been said about the Roberts Court has told us a 
great deal about the commentators’ political, economic, and moral 
commitments—and very little about the Court’s decisions as judgments 
of law.7 
One response to the emptiness and predictability of so much 
purported analysis, enthusiastically endorsed by many political 
scientists, is to conclude that there is little or no value to the enterprise of 
making jurisprudential sense of the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional 
decisions, in this or any other era. The Court is a political actor, the 
Justices’ constitutional decisions are exercises of political choice (which 
of course need not mean political choice in a crude, partisan sense), and 
whatever socially valuable contributions scholars can make by studying 
the Court must lie in the various modes of empirical investigation into 
the demonstrable sources and ascertainable consequences of the Court’s 
decisions. But empirical research, valuable as it is in ascertaining the 
Court’s patterns of decision and its impact on the world, cannot displace 
entirely normative analysis, at least without a price heavier than perhaps 
most of us are willing to pay. The search to make sense of what the 
Court actually does, in the light of what the Court ought to do, is 
essential to the idea that the Court is actually “doing law” when it 
announces constitutional decisions. If we can say nothing about the 
Court’s success, or failure, in carrying out the task of constitutional 
                                                     
6. Perhaps the clearest statement of this fundamental truth—that we can recognize the relativity 
of all perspectives without that recognition implying in the least that no view is in fact correct—is to 
be found in Peter Berger’s classic discussion of religious belief. See PETER L. BERGER, A RUMOR 
OF ANGELS 31–53 (1969). We cannot stop to discuss the philosophical issues; the purpose of citing 
Berger is solely to reject out of hand any argument that evaluation of the Court can only be an 
expression of the evaluator’s prejudices. 
7. There is little value in trying to determine whether any individual decision (or decisions) or 
Justice (or coalition of Justices) is activist or restrained; there again the conclusions are too 
predictable to be enlightening. The problems with “judicial activism” as a meaningful tool of 
analysis are well-known, and no purpose would be served by rehearsing them here.  
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decision responsibly, as a matter of law, other than to express our 
pleasure or dismay at the apparent politics of the Justices, then we have 
emptied that task, and constitutional law itself, of any distinctive quality. 
Despite the political predictability of most of their work, however, the 
Term-end commentators on the Roberts Court—both the critics and the 
apologists—were right to look for legal patterns in the work of the 
Court. Their analyses ended up generating more heat than light because 
the commentators tackled their subject too directly, looking too quickly 
at the Roberts Court’s outcomes. Those outcomes sort out along 
ideological lines neatly enough that the analysts find it all but impossible 
to more than attack or defend the Court along lines essentially, and 
demonstrably, political. 
What we need is more in the way of indirect analysis, commentary 
that looks at the patterns of thought, the assumptions and 
preconceptions, that the Justices of the Roberts Court employ. It is in 
these jurisprudential patterns of thought that we can hope to ground 
evaluations of the Court’s constitutional work that do not simply 
replicate our own or the Justices’ political predispositions. This Article 
is meant as a modest contribution to this task of making jurisprudential 
sense—lawyers’ sense—out of the decisions of the Roberts Court 
through the indirect approach of asking not what the Court held in 
constitutional cases, but rather how the Justices think about the practice 
of constitutional decisionmaking. 
In Part I, this Article looks to the Court’s recent decisions District of 
Columbia v. Heller8 and McDonald v. City of Chicago9 and finds the 
seeds of a new direction in judicial review of legislative and agency 
decisionmaking. Specifically, footnote 27 in Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion in Heller10 and the majority’s treatment of the dissent in 
McDonald11 provide evidence that the Roberts Court is moving away 
                                                     
8. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
9. 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
10. 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (“Justice Breyer correctly notes that this law, like almost all laws, would 
pass rational-basis scrutiny. But rational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used when 
evaluating laws under constitutional commands that are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws. 
In those cases, ‘rational basis’ is not just the standard of scrutiny, but the very substance of the 
constitutional guarantee. Obviously, the same test could not be used to evaluate the extent to which 
a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee 
against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms. If all that was 
required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment 
would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have 
no effect.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
11. 561 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 3048–50 (discussing Justice Breyer’s arguments in dissent). 
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from current constitutional doctrines and towards a less onerous 
standard. The thesis of this Article is that the doctrinal vision of 
constitutional law, to which footnote 27 is an important clue, has 
profound implications for the role of constitutional law in our society. If 
the vision encapsulated in footnote 27 supplied the accepted 
presuppositions on which lawyers approach constitutional issues, the 
results would profoundly affect not only the specific outcomes the U.S. 
Supreme Court might reach, but also the overall role of constitutional 
law in the life of the Republic. 
Parts II and III outline the key features of constitutional law, as 
currently practiced, that footnote 27 and Engquist v. Oregon Department 
of Agriculture12 imply we should abandon. In Part II, this Article 
discusses the role of constitutional doctrine, judicial standards of 
scrutiny or modes of analysis that the Court creates in order to 
implement constitutional norms without claiming that the standards or 
modes of review are themselves identical to those norms. The distinction 
between the standard the Court employs and the underlying command 
the Court is enforcing gives rise to a “doctrinal gap.” The doctrinal gap 
is a central feature of constitutional thought that is also of great practical 
importance. 
Part III discusses the significance of the doctrinal gap in argument 
over the authority of the Court’s constitutional decisions. If a precedent 
is understood to rest on a doctrinal basis rather than to involve the direct 
application of a constitutional norm, the Court has considerable freedom 
to follow the precedent, even if a majority of the Justices are 
unsympathetic to it as a matter of constitutional principle. A precedent 
that is equated to the content of the norm, in contrast, tends to stand or 
fall with the continuing existence of a majority that believes it to be 
correct. 
Part IV turns to the significance of the doctrinal gap for our 
understanding of the roles of the judiciary and the political branches of 
government in the enforcement of the Constitution. This Part argues that 
the prevalence of the doctrinal gap in constitutional law creates an 
intellectual space for political-branch enforcement that recognizes the 
priority of the courts’ decisions. This Part then examines the idea of the 
doctrinal gap as applied to a famous rational-basis decision, Williamson 
v. Lee Optical,13 and thus brings the reader back to the central claim of 
footnote 27, that rational-basis scrutiny gives rise to no doctrinal gap 
                                                     
12. 553 U.S. 591 (2008). 
13. 348 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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because it is a direct application of the constitutional norm it 
implements. 
Part V suggests that footnote 27’s attack on the doctrinal gap could 
lead to profound changes in current constitutional thought and practice, 
rendering judicial precedents more brittle and less stable, thereby 
undermining the independent role of the political branches in the 
implementation of the Constitution. 
Part VI examines Justice Scalia’s assertion in footnote 27 that 
constitutional commands enforced by rational-basis review “are 
themselves prohibitions on irrational laws.”14 Rational-basis review has 
traditionally assumed that in constitutional law, “rationality” has 
normative content. Rather than merely denoting the absence of blatant 
illogic, the requirement of rationality has included a prohibition on 
governmental actions that lack an independent, public-focused 
justification.15 As Justice Scalia—and Chief Justice Roberts in his 
opinion for the Court in Engquist—understand constitutional rationality, 
this normative dimension vanishes, and the constitutional rule becomes a 
simple ban on purposeless or self-contradictory actions.16 
Finally, Part VII reflects on how footnote 27, and the constitutional 
vision it embodies, fit into contemporary debate, and what they may say 
about the future of constitutional law in the era of the Roberts Court. 
I. MCDONALD AND HELLER SIGNAL A NEW DIRECTION FOR 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE AND AGENCY 
DECISIONMAKING 
Following what has become tradition, the U.S. Supreme Court handed 
down several long-awaited decisions on the last regular day of its 2009 
Term, among them McDonald v. City of Chicago. McDonald held, by a 
5–4 majority, that the individual right to bear arms recognized in 2008 in 
District of Columbia v. Heller constrains state and local governmental 
                                                     
14. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. 
15. The Court’s constitutional case law makes no systematic distinction of the type sometimes 
drawn between rationality in the sense of an absence of illogic and reasonability in the sense of 
conforming to some normative standard of what makes good sense. For a succinct discussion of the 
distinction, see JON ELSTER, REASON AND RATIONALITY 1–4 (Steven Rendall trans., 2009). Put in 
terms of this distinction, footnote 27 proposes that the constitutional rule prohibits only laws that are 
irrational, while this Article maintains that the traditional view is that the Constitution prohibits 
rational but unreasonable laws as well. 
16. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 598 (resting decision on the “traditional view of the core concern of the 
Equal Protection Clause as a shield against arbitrary classifications”). 
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action.17 The Court acknowledged through its timing the Justices’ 
awareness that the decision in McDonald was momentous and 
unavoidably controversial. Commentators obligingly treated the 
outcome as affording important clues to the purposes and future course 
of action of the Roberts Court.18 Unfortunately, the commentators 
generally looked in the wrong direction by focusing on the fact that a 
majority upheld the gun-owners’ claim. That the outcome in McDonald, 
like that in Heller, was of great human significance is undeniable—the 
extent to which law-abiding citizens can possess operational firearms is 
of life and death significance, although people argue over which side of 
that dichotomy is at stake.19 But it is unclear that McDonald’s holding 
was particularly significant in a broader jurisprudential sense. Having 
decided in Heller that the Second Amendment protects an individual 
right to bear arms,20 the further conclusion that it is “a provision of the 
Bill of Rights that protects a right that is fundamental from an American 
perspective”21 and therefore “applies equally to the Federal Government 
                                                     
17. The lead opinion in McDonald, written by Justice Alito, concluded that the Second 
Amendment right the Court found in Heller applies to the states because of its incorporation into the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. ___, 
130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010). Justice Thomas reached the same outcome by way of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, and therefore did not join the sections of Alito’s opinion rejecting the 
petitioners’ argument based on that clause. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justices Stevens, 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor dissented. Most commentary on McDonald found this breakdown 
of the Justices in McDonald unsurprising in that it replicated the vote in Heller, except for the 
substitution of Sotomayor (a Democratic appointment to the Court) for Justice Souter (a “liberal” in 
contemporary journalistic usage). 
18. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Dahlia Lithwick, Watch As We Make this Law Disappear, 
SLATE, http://www.slate.com/id/2269715/ (Oct. 4, 2010) (arguing that the McDonald outcome is 
evidence that the Roberts Court majority is successfully concealing an ideological agenda by 
sometimes reaching results that are supported by some “left wing intellectuals”); Adam Winkler, 
The Supreme Court Under Chief Justice Roberts Moves Left, DAILY BEAST, 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-07-02/supreme-court-under-chief-justice-
roberts-moves-left/ (July 2, 2010) (arguing that McDonald among other decisions shows that the 
Roberts Court is “not quite the extreme, right-wing court some people imagine it to be”). 
19. Compare David Kopel, A Chance to Fight Back, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/01/11/more-guns-less-crime/a-chance-to-fight-back 
(last updated Jan. 12, 2011, 11:41 PM) (lawful possession of individual firearms saves lives), with 
Guns, Democracy, and Freedom, COALITION TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE, http://www.csgv.org/issues-
and-campaigns/guns-democracy-and-freedom (last visited May 3, 2011) (political campaign for 
right to bear arms results in “real violence in our country”). 
20. The respondent municipalities in McDonald did not ask the Court to reconsider Heller and 
Justice Alito noted for the majority that “nothing written since Heller persuades us to reopen the 
question there decided.” McDonald, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. at 3048. Justice Alito specifically had 
in mind the “question of original meaning” that the Heller majority thought determinative on the 
legal question of the Second Amendment’s meaning. 
21. Id. at 3050. 
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and the States,”22 is plausible.23 Whatever their societal importance, 
however, it is not the holding in McDonald or Heller that should be 
addressed, but rather a side-bar issue that appeared (in somewhat 
different forms) in both cases. 
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Heller reached the 
substantive merits and held the District of Columbia’s handgun 
ordinance unconstitutional.24 In contrast, in McDonald, the lower federal 
courts had thought themselves bound by old U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent to dismiss a right-to-bear-arms challenge to two local handgun 
laws. Justice Alito’s plurality opinion accordingly limited itself to 
deciding that the Second Amendment right, through its incorporation in 
the Fourteenth Amendment, is relevant to evaluating a local law’s 
constitutionality.25 Whether the local ordinances are constitutional, and 
precisely what standard of review to apply in determining the answers, 
remains to be decided on remand.26 Alito did, however, state two 
propositions that the plurality Justices presumably intend to bind future 
decisions. First, he reiterated the Heller Court’s express repudiation of 
any implication that the right to bear arms is absolute: 
[O]ur holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding 
regulatory measures as “prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” “laws forbidding the 
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” We repeat those 
assurances here. Despite municipal respondents’ doomsday 
proclamations, incorporation does not imperil every law 
regulating firearms.27 
Second, Alito countered Justice Breyer’s assertion in dissent that 
“incorporation will require judges to assess the costs and benefits of 
                                                     
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 3050. While McDonald does continue the incorporation process of applying the Bill of 
Rights to the states, that process has almost reached its logical end-point. As Justice Alito noted, 
only four provisions of the Bill of Rights remain unincorporated, id. at 3035 n.13, and two of those 
(the grand jury requirement of the fifth and the civil jury guarantee of the Seventh Amendment) are 
excluded from incorporation by “considerations of stare decisis” that he suggested would govern the 
Court if the issue should be raised. Id. at 3046. 
24. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
25. McDonald, 561 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 3050. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 3047 (citation omitted). 
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firearms restrictions and thus to make difficult empirical judgments in an 
area in which they lack expertise”:28 
As we have noted, while [Justice Breyer’s] opinion in Heller 
recommended an interest-balancing test, the Court specifically rejected 
that suggestion. “The very enumeration of the right takes out of the 
hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the 
power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth 
insisting upon.”29 
Justice Breyer was unpersuaded. If the right is not absolute—and 
Justice Alito both affirmed that it is not and gave examples of gun 
control laws that might not violate it30—Breyer asked, how are courts to 
decide which laws are valid and which transgress the constitutional 
right? 
In answering such questions judges cannot simply refer to 
judicial homilies, such as Blackstone’s 18th-century perception 
that a man’s home is his castle. Nor can the plurality so simply 
reject, by mere assertion, the fact that “incorporation will require 
judges to assess the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions.” 
How can the Court assess the strength of the government’s 
regulatory interests without addressing issues of empirical fact? 
How can the Court determine if a regulation is appropriately 
tailored without considering its impact?31 
Alito’s examples of (potentially) valid regulations of gun possession, 
according to Breyer, have no basis other than the ipse dixit of the 
McDonald plurality and before that of the Heller majority: 
[T]he Court has haphazardly created a few simple rules . . . . But 
why these rules and not others? Does the Court know that these 
regulations are justified by some special gun-related risk of 
death? In fact, the Court does not know. It has simply invented 
rules that sound sensible without being able to explain why or 
how Chicago’s handgun ban is different.32 
                                                     
28. Id. at 3050. 
29. Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
30. Id. at 3047 (“repeat[ing the] assurances” in Heller that “our holding d[oes] not cast doubt on 
such longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and 
the mentally ill,’ ‘laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places . . . or laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms’” (citing Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 625–28 (2008))).   
31. McDonald, 561 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 3127 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
32. Id. (citation omitted). 
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There is an unfortunate tone of asperity in these comments that might 
mislead the unwary reader into thinking that one side or the other is 
guilty of a lapse in judicial candor—that Justice Alito is hiding the ball 
or Justice Breyer is proposing that judges surreptitiously rewrite the 
Constitution’s commands—but either conclusion would be wrong. Alito 
and Breyer debated the question of how to think about a standard of 
review for legislation affecting Second Amendment rights because they 
disagree even more fundamentally, and as a matter of principle, over 
what constitutional law is and how judges are to understand their task in 
enforcing that law. Their debate over how to characterize the Second 
Amendment right is a clue, if a somewhat murky one, to the nature of 
this more profound disagreement. 
In order to clarify what this deeper argument might be, it is useful to 
turn to an earlier exchange in Heller, which lays behind the remarks of 
Justices Alito and Breyer in McDonald. In Heller, Justice Scalia for the 
majority asserted that the district’s ordinance under review was 
unconstitutional “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have 
applied to enumerated constitutional rights . . . .”33 Breyer in dissent 
responded that the ordinance “certainly would not be unconstitutional 
under, for example, a ‘rational basis’ standard,”34 an observation that 
Justice Scalia addressed in footnote 27. Justice Scalia acknowledged that 
Breyer was correct that the Court would uphold the law under the 
familiar rational-basis test, but according to majority that was irrelevant: 
[R]ational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used 
when evaluating laws under constitutional commands that are 
themselves prohibitions on irrational laws. In those cases, 
“rational basis” is not just the standard of scrutiny, but the very 
substance of the constitutional guarantee. Obviously, the same 
test could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a 
legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the 
freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the 
right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms.35 
The Heller dissenters ignored footnote 27, and so far it has attracted 
little attention from commentators, who generally have focused on the 
Second Amendment issues.36 The footnote’s apparent obscurity is 
                                                     
33. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008). 
34. Id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
35. Id. at 628 n.27 (citation omitted). 
36. See generally Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Five Takes on District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (2008); Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-
Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278 (2009); Mark Tushnet, Permissible Gun 
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understandable, but a mistake, for it provides a deeply revealing window 
into how at least two key members of the Roberts Court—Justice Scalia 
and the Chief Justice himself—are attempting to reorient constitutional 
law as a whole.37 The debate between Alito and Breyer in McDonald is 
only one of several indications from the October Term 2009 that this 
attempt is ongoing.38 
The heart of this Article lies in the claim that footnote 27’s seemingly 
offhand reference to the meaning of the rational-basis test indicates a 
much broader constitutional vision that animates key members of the 
Roberts Court. Rational-basis scrutiny, as traditionally understood, flows 
from a presupposition of American constitutionalism so basic and 
pervasive that it is easy to overlook: in its dealings with persons, the 
American government is under a constitutional obligation to act 
                                                     
Regulations After Heller: Speculations About Method and Outcomes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1425 
(2009). 
37. Footnote 27 is admittedly dicta, and at another place in his Heller opinion, Justice Scalia 
dismissed the importance of what he termed a “gratuitous” comment found in a footnote in an 
earlier case. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625 n.25 (citing Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65–66 n.8 
(1980)). “It is inconceivable,” Justice Scalia asserted, “that we would rest our interpretation of the 
basic meaning of any guarantee of the Bill of Rights upon such a footnoted dictum in a case where 
the point was not at issue and was not argued.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 625 n.25. In this regard, it is 
ironic that footnote 27 quotes the famous footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), in criticism of Justice Breyer. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. Footnote 4, of 
course, was a classic example of footnoted dicta  on a “point . . . not at issue and . . . not argued,” 
and for precisely that reason Justice Frankfurter vehemently objected in a later case when other 
Justices suggested that footnote 4 represented a position endorsed by the Court. Kovacs v. Cooper, 
336 U.S. 77, 90–91 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“A footnote hardly seems to be an 
appropriate way of announcing a new constitutional doctrine, and the Carolene footnote did not 
purport to announce any new doctrine . . . .”). Despite Justice Frankfurter’s protest, that footnote 
went on, of course, to become one of the best known and most influential statements in any judicial 
opinion in American history, which gives one pause in resting too much on the suggestion that 
footnoted dicta are of little importance. Footnote 27, in any event, is not the first example of Justice 
Scalia placing a major statement about constitutional law in a footnote. See, e.g., Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (discussing role of tradition in constitutional analysis); cf. 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 97–98 (1991) (“Justice 
Scalia’s footnote 6 . . . seems destined to take its place alongside Justice Stone’s famous footnote 4 
as one of constitutional law’s most provocative asides . . . .”). Today’s dictum is tomorrow’s ratio 
decidendi, footnote or not. 
38. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 
3138 (2010) (majority opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (applying novel principle to limit Congress’s 
authority to impair the president’s removal power); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (applying 
novel concept of a compensable judicial taking); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 
876 (2010)  (overruling two major precedents on regulation of campaign finance); id. at 920 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (explaining his willingness to overrule the precedents:  “When 
considering whether to reexamine a prior erroneous holding, we must balance the importance of 
having constitutional questions decided against the importance of having them decided right.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
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rationally. Rationality in turn requires both that public actions make 
sense and that they make good sense, that they have some legitimate 
purpose.39 The constitutional law of liberty and equality is, in short, a 
mode of reasoning about what is rational in the public sphere—and 
rational in this broad and partly normative sense.40 Footnote 27, 
consistent with arguments that Justice Scalia has advanced elsewhere41 
and that Chief Justice Roberts further explicated in an opinion issued 
shortly before Heller,42 rests on a presupposition that is almost entirely 
the reverse. What makes good sense—what is a legitimate end as 
opposed to an illegitimate one—is a matter not for reason but for choice, 
and as such it ineluctably belongs to the world of politics. The 
Constitution, through the judicial enforcement of rules that are 
themselves the product of political will, may set bounds on this political 
domain but has no purchase within it. Constitutional law is a form of 
reasoning about the irrational, about the line that necessarily separates 
decisions that are susceptible to rule from those that are in the most 
literal sense arbitrary—the expression of the will. 
II. THE GAP BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND AND 
JUDICIAL RULE DEFINES CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 
Footnote 27’s central assertion is that “‘rational basis’ is not just the 
standard of scrutiny” in cases where the Court properly employs it, but is 
“the very substance of the constitutional guarantee” itself.43 The 
                                                     
39. See the classic discussion in ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 37–38, 41 (Yale Univ. Press 2nd ed. 1986). 
40. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 923, 927–
32 (2010) (discussing “the implicit normative premises of rational basis analysis”). The point is 
neither novel nor controversial. See Robert W. Bennett, “Mere” Rationality in Constitutional Law: 
Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1056–57 (1979); Joseph Tussman 
& Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 345–46 (1949). 
41. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000–01 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the “pronouncement of 
constitutional law [that] rests primarily on value judgments”). 
42. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 603 (2008) (holding that in a public 
employment context, “the very discretion that . . . state officials are entrusted to exercise” precludes 
an equal protection challenge that the officials engaged in “the arbitrary singling out of a particular 
person”). 
43. Footnote 27 also claims that the U.S. Supreme Court does not employ the rational basis test 
when the “constitutional command” at issue is “a specific, enumerated right.” Justice Breyer’s 
invocation of the test was therefore entirely beside the point, because the Second Amendment is 
enumerated. Although this sounds like a truism—of course the flaccid rational basis test has no 
application when enumerated constitutional rights are at stake!—it is less self-evidently true than a 
careless reader might think. See H. Jefferson Powell, Rational Basis and Enumerated Rights 
(manuscript on file with author). 
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distinction Justice Scalia is drawing in this observation reflects the 
omnipresence of doctrine in constitutional law. The U.S. Supreme Court 
often announces, applies, or rejects constitutional doctrines—the 
standards or tests or modes of scrutiny or implementation that the Court 
employs in applying the Constitution to particular cases.44 In terms of 
legal method, as Professor Henry Paul Monaghan pointed out in a 
seminal article, such doctrines involve “the creation of a common law 
substructure to carry out the purposes and policies” of the Constitution’s 
commands.45 Like traditional common law decisionmaking, the creation 
of constitutional doctrine reflects a judicial evaluation and choice among 
competing means of executing the principles in question, although the 
Justices often do not comment on the rationales for (and against) 
particular doctrines.46 This sort of second-order discussion, when it does 
occur, almost always confirms the “strategic” nature of doctrine: 
doctrinal formulations blend the Justices’ understanding of the 
Constitution’s meaning with the practicalities of judicial 
decisionmaking.47 The following examples illustrate this theme. 
                                                     
44. There is no single or canonical definition of “doctrine” in constitutional law, although in 
recent years a number of eminent constitutional scholars have devoted considerable effort to 
examining what aspects of constitutional law the term encompasses. See generally RICHARD H. 
FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001); Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 1140 (1994); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 
U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). I am not using the word in any precise or highly theoretical sense. 
Professor Denning has written a valuable essay on this scholarship in relation to Heller. Brannon P. 
Denning, The New Doctrinalism in Constitutional Scholarship and District of Columbia v. Heller, 
75 TENN. L. REV. 789 (2008). 
45. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common 
Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18 (1975). Monaghan argued that such doctrines ought to be subject to 
congressional modification. Id. at 3 (“[C]onstitutional common law [ought to be] subject to 
amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress.”). The Court declined to adopt this view as 
to the Miranda warnings in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000), discussed infra at 
the text accompanying notes 63–67.  
46. In addition to footnote 27, Heller contains an interesting back and forth between Justices 
Scalia and Breyer over Breyer’s answer to the question “[w]hat kind of constitutional standard 
should the Court use” in applying the Second Amendment? Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570, 687 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Breyer argued that in practice any 
standard will “turn into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the Second 
Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety concerns on the other,” and proposed 
“adopt[ing] such an interest-balancing inquiry explicitly.” Id. at 689. Justice Scalia responded that 
such “a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach” would be unprecedented and contrary to the 
very purpose of the “enumeration of the right.” Id. at 634 (majority opinion). 
47. For the adjective “strategic,” and an insightful study of this aspect of constitutional doctrine, 
see FALLON, supra note 44, at 5 (“[T]he Court devises and then implements strategies for enforcing 
constitutional values.”). Professor Fallon clearly does not intend, nor do I in adopting his 
terminology, any suggestion of ulterior, much less improper motivation on the Court’s part. 
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In Grutter v. Bollinger,48 Justice O’Connor explained that the Court 
has ordained the use of strict scrutiny in equal protection cases involving 
explicit racial classifications in order to identify those situations in 
which classifications are in fact being used for a constitutionally 
improper purpose: 
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such 
race-based measures, we have no way to determine what 
“classifications are benign or remedial and what classifications 
are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority 
or simple racial politics.” We apply strict scrutiny to all racial 
classifications to smoke out illegitimate uses of race by assuring 
that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to 
warrant use of a highly suspect tool. . . .  
  . . . . 
  . . . Strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for 
carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the 
reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the 
use of race in that particular context.49 
Justice O’Connor’s rationale, which she first articulated in the City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.50 decision years before, is quite different 
from that which Justice Kennedy stated in his concurrence in Croson. In 
Croson, Justice Kennedy wrote that in light of the Court’s case law, 
strict scrutiny was the appropriate means to respect stare decisis while 
implementing what he saw as the Constitution’s almost per se ban on 
racial classifications regardless of governmental purpose: “On the 
assumption that it will vindicate the principle of race neutrality found in 
the Equal Protection Clause, I accept the less absolute rule” of strict 
scrutiny.51 Where Justice O’Connor saw strict scrutiny as an affirmative 
tool enabling the courts to uncover unconstitutional state action 
masquerading under a claim of legitimacy, Justice Kennedy perceived an 
underenforcement of the actual constitutional norm, acceptable only on 
the assumption that the shortfall in constitutional principle would be 
minimal. 
In another setting, Justice Kennedy explained that his deliberate 
adoption of a standard not itself directly commanded by the 
                                                     
48. 539 U.S. 306 (2002). 
49. Id. at 326, 327 (majority opinion of O’Connor, J.) (alteration in original) (quoting City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
50. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
51. Croson, 488 U.S. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
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constitutional text rested on the need to reconcile constitutional 
commitments that are potentially in tension with one another. Writing 
for the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores,52 Justice Kennedy explained 
his articulation of a new doctrinal standard by referring to the danger 
posed to one constitutional principle—Congress’s power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment is a power to remedy or prevent violations of the 
amendment53—by another constitutional principle—Congress must have 
“wide latitude” to devise remedial legislation:54 
There must be a congruence and proportionality between the 
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to 
that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become 
substantive [i.e., not remedial] in operation and effect. History 
and our case law support drawing the distinction, one apparent 
from the text of the Amendment.55 
The Constitution itself distinguishes the remedial legislation it 
authorizes from the substantive it does not; the test of congruence and 
proportionality is the means Justice Kennedy devised to enable the Court 
to police Congress’s (possibly innocent) tendency to overreach.56 
What has been for many decades the Court’s standard explanation for 
rational-basis scrutiny in equal protection cases is very similar, only 
there the Court’s stated concern has been to police itself and other courts 
against overreaching into the constitutional domain of the legislature. 
Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court in FCC v. Beach 
Communications57 is typical: 
This standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint. “The 
Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer 
antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be 
rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention 
is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think 
a political branch has acted.”58 
                                                     
52. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
53. Id. at 519. 
54. Id. at 520. 
55. Id. 
56. Although Justice Kennedy commanded a near-unanimous Court in City of Boerne on this 
issue, the congruence and proportionality test is already under considerable strain, with Justice 
Scalia having expressly rejected it. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 561–65 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting), discussed infra notes 80–84. 
57. 508 U.S. 307 (1993). 
58. Id. at 314 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 (1979)). 
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Justice Thomas continued, “Only by faithful adherence to this guiding 
principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the 
legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.”59 
The rational-basis test, like the congruence and proportionality test, is 
instrumental or strategic, the means by which the judiciary avoids its 
own (doubtless innocent) temptation to correct unwise legislative 
choices. 
In Dickerson v. United States,60 the Court addressed the 
constitutionality of a 1968 statutory provision that was an unabashed 
congressional attempt to overrule the famous Miranda v. Arizona61 
decision. Language in post-Miranda opinions strongly implied that 
Miranda was not directly justified by the Constitution and, in dissent, 
Justice Scalia said as much. He insisted that the Court lacked the 
authority to invalidate the act of Congress, there being no violation of 
the Constitution.62 For the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that 
warnings required by Miranda are not “required by the Constitution, in 
the sense that nothing else will suffice to satisfy constitutional 
requirements”; the warnings were a strategic device created and imposed 
by the Court because the Justices believed existing practice ran an 
unacceptably high risk of permitting unconstitutional criminal 
convictions.63 The fact that the warnings themselves are not directly 
commanded by the Constitution, however, did not make Miranda sub- 
or non-constitutional in nature. Such a decision is “a normal part of 
constitutional law”64 and it “announced a constitutional rule”65 that, 
unless changed by the Court, is as obligatory as the direct commands of 
the Constitution’s text.66 Therefore, judge-made constitutional doctrine 
                                                     
59. Id. at 315 (quoting Lehnhusen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 365 (1973)). 
60. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
61. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
62. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 446 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[B]ecause a majority of the Court does 
not believe [that violating Miranda violates the Constitution, the Court] acts in plain violation of the 
Constitution when it denies effect to this Act of Congress.”). 
63. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442. 
64. Id. at 441. 
65. Id. at 444. 
66. Despite Justice Scalia’s characteristic vigor in expressing his disagreement with the 
Dickerson majority, id. at 457–61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (attacking as “a lawless practice” the 
imposition of prophylactic rules that go beyond the actual substance of constitutional prohibitions), 
it is a mistake to read his Dickerson opinion as an outright rejection of doctrine. See, e.g., Maryland 
v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1220–24 (2010) (majority opinion of Scalia, J.) 
(adopting, after considering benefits and costs of various rules, a fourteen-day presumption that a 
confession is involuntary under Edwards v. Arizona after a break in custody); Montejo v. Louisiana, 
556 U.S.___, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2089 (2009) (majority opinion of Scalia, J.) (discussing the proper 
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can impose restrictions on other governmental entities that go beyond 
what the Constitution itself directly requires where, in the Court’s view, 
doing so is necessary to protect a constitutional norm. 
The Justices agree—or at least they agreed before footnote 27 in 
Heller—that constitutional doctrine is strategic. In other words, the 
Court crafts doctrinal rules in light of the Justices’ perceptions of the 
courts’ capabilities, the practical consequences of adopting (or failing to 
adopt) the rule, and the likelihood in the given circumstances that there 
has been an actual violation of the Constitution. There is, then, a gap 
between what the direct command of the Constitution literally requires, 
what must of necessity be done by the courts or other entities “to satisfy 
[the letter of the] constitutional requirements,”67 and what the Court 
deems appropriate or even essential in the enforcement of those 
requirements. It is the existence of this gap between constitutional 
command and judicial rule, in a sense, that defines constitutional 
doctrine. 
III. THE OPERATION OF STARE DECISIS DEPENDS UPON 
WHETHER THE ISSUE IS FRAMED AS ONE OF “FAULTY 
DOCTRINE” OR “ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION” 
The obvious question at this point is whether there is anything more 
than theoretical significance to the fact that constitutional doctrine is 
characterized by the admitted doctrinal gap between its content and the 
Constitution’s direct commands. At first glance, Dickerson might seem 
to eliminate any practical distinction between a rule or standard that the 
Constitution literally requires and a rule or standard that is the product of 
the Court’s doctrinal creativity. The latter, so long as the Court adheres 
to it, is as binding as the former.68 If the Court recognizes no pragmatic 
                                                     
reasoning to apply “[w]hen this Court creates a prophylactic rule in order to protect a constitutional 
right”); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I have no 
problem with a system of abstract tests such as rational basis, intermediate, and strict scrutiny 
(though I think we can do better than applying strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny whenever we 
feel like it). Such formulas are essential to evaluating whether the new restrictions that a changing 
society constantly imposes upon private conduct comport with that ‘equal protection’ our society 
has always accorded in the past.”). 
67. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442. 
68. Dickerson is a particularly striking case in this regard because Miranda itself had 
acknowledged that there might be other, legislative means of insuring against the constitutional 
violations that the Miranda warnings were meant to prevent. This is an unusual admission by the 
Court that the very doctrine it was creating was contingent and subject to political rethinking. The 
statutory provision that Congress enacted, however, was simply an attempt to restore the legal test 
that the Miranda Court had found inadequate to protect the constitutional norms—it was, in short, 
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distinction between the Constitution’s commands and its own doctrinal 
elaborations, footnote 27’s equation of command and doctrine in the 
context of rational-basis scrutiny might seem of no real significance. In 
fact, however, the doctrinal gap plays a critical role in the judicial 
elaboration of constitutional law because of its significance in the 
application of stare decisis. 
Any sensible resolution of the difficult question of when the Court 
should overrule constitutional precedent has to depend, in part, on 
whether the challenge to the precedent rests on the claim that the earlier 
Court misunderstood the Constitution itself, or instead that the doctrinal 
strategy it adopted for implementing the Constitution turned out to be 
faulty. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Croson expressly 
recognized the possibility that he might subsequently rethink his 
willingness to employ strict scrutiny in the analysis of affirmative action 
programs.69 He concurred in the Court’s use of strict scrutiny, which is a 
doctrinal tool that is less absolute than a per se ban on racial 
classifications, on the assumption that strict scrutiny would “vindicate 
the principle of race neutrality found in the Equal Protection Clause.”70 
If in practice strict scrutiny proved to allow uses of race that undermined 
that principle, Justice Kennedy was prepared to discard the doctrine 
notwithstanding stare decisis.71 The sort of argument relevant to 
persuading Justice Kennedy to act on this announced reservation would 
concern not the meaning of equal protection, but the practical results of 
applying strict scrutiny. 
Justices are not usually so explicit about the possible problems with 
the doctrine they are announcing, but a reservation similar to Justice 
Kennedy’s in Croson is implicit in every explanation of a Justice’s or the 
Court’s adoption of a particular doctrine. Consider Justice O’Connor’s 
doctrinal explanation in Grutter, which quoted from her Croson opinion 
announcing strict scrutiny as the test for evaluating race-based 
affirmative action.72 The rationale for using the test, she wrote, is that it 
                                                     
an attempt by Congress to overrule the Court rather than to meet the Court’s concerns in some other 
fashion. 
69. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 519 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment) (“On the assumption that [strict scrutiny] will vindicate the 
principle of race neutrality” concluding that “I am not convinced we need adopt [a per se rule] at 
this point.”). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493). To be 
precise, Croson adopted strict scrutiny for state and local-governmental use of race in affirmative 
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“provide[s] a framework for carefully examining the importance and the 
sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker,”73 
thus enabling the courts “to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by 
assuring that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to 
warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”74 Implicit in this reasoning is the 
reservation that Justice O’Connor (or the Court) would adopt a different 
approach if strict scrutiny were shown to be inadequate or misguided as 
a means of “smoking out” illegitimate uses of race.75 
In Croson, Justice O’Connor’s rationale for employing strict scrutiny 
seems to rely on an underlying view of equal protection that identifies 
the intentional or purposeful infliction of harm as the primary concern of 
equal protection with respect to race—strict scrutiny “smokes out” 
concealed purposes of that prohibited kind—while Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence identifies “race neutrality” as the constitutional principle at 
stake. The arguments crafted to convince Justice O’Connor that she 
adopt Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of the Constitution76—or that 
Justice Kennedy adopt Justice O’Connor’s—would be quite different 
from those crafted merely to convince either to adopt a different 
doctrinal approach in order to implement an understanding of the 
constitutional norm that remained unchanged. Because of the presence 
of the doctrinal gap, for either Justice to modify or even abandon strict 
scrutiny as the appropriate test in affirmative action cases would be 
nothing more than what Chief Justice Rehnquist in Dickerson called “the 
sort of modifications” that are “a normal part of constitutional law” 
because “no constitutional rule is immutable.”77 
                                                     
action. The later Adarand decision, in an opinion also written by Justice O’Connor applied the test 
to federal actions. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995). 
73. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327. 
74. Id. at 326 (alteration in original) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
75. There is an interesting ambiguity in Justice O’Connor’s explanation. Her reference to strict 
scrutiny determining whether the government has “a goal important enough to warrant use of a 
highly suspect tool” suggests a quite different rationale for using this doctrine: a direct weighing of 
the importance of the governmental purpose—ex hypothesi legitimate or benign as opposed to 
covertly malicious—against the harm to constitutional values. See id. at 327. 
76. Her language suggesting that strict scrutiny balances governmental purpose against individual 
interest makes it slightly unclear what Justice O’Connor’s understanding of the underlying 
constitutional norm is, but the predominant impression, I think, is that created by her invocation of 
the “smoking out” metaphor. 
77. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000). As the Chief Justice noted, “No court 
laying down a general rule can possibly foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will 
seek to apply it.” Id. Dickerson reminds us that because of stare decisis, the burden of persuading a 
Justice or the Court to abandon altogether a doctrine is considerably greater than is required to 
convince the Court to make adjustments to the doctrine. 
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Justice Scalia’s changing view of the congruence and proportionality 
test adopted in City of Boerne is a good example of a Justice responding 
to later experience that, in his view, shows a doctrinal approach to be 
misguided. Justice Scalia joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court 
without any stated reservation about the new doctrinal formulation,78 
although in a later opinion, he stated that he joined in the City of Boerne 
opinion “with some misgiving . . . because [such tests] have a way of 
turning into vehicles for the implementation of individual judges’ policy 
preferences.”79 But in Tennessee v. Lane,80 the second of two decisions81 
that he thought failed to respect the underlying constitutional norm 
despite their application of the test, Justice Scalia announced a change of 
position: 
I yield to the lessons of experience. The “congruence and 
proportionality” standard, like all such flabby tests, is a standing 
invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven 
decisionmaking. . . . 
  I would replace “congruence and proportionality” with 
another test—one that provides a clear, enforceable limitation 
supported by the text of § 5.82 
As he made clear in his opinion in Lane, Justice Scalia continued to 
agree with the City of Boerne Court’s interpretation of the constitutional 
norm governing Congress’s exercise of the power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment; it was the doctrinal approach in that decision, 
not its understanding of the amendment, that he concluded was faulty.83 
In contrast, an argument aimed at convincing Justices that they should 
repudiate or substantially modify parts of their understandings of the 
Constitution itself asks them to confess error on an altogether more 
fundamental level. Such arguments are, unsurprisingly, rarely 
successful. Even more rarely do Justices admit that they have changed 
their minds at the level of underlying constitutional understanding. The 
                                                     
78. Justice Scalia declined to join one subsection of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, dealing with the 
legislative history in Congress of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but stated no concerns 
with the substance of the congruence and proportionality test. City of Boerne v. Flores, 520 U.S. 
507, 511 n.* (1997). 
79. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
80. 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
81. The other decision was Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 
(2003). 
82. Lane, 541 U.S. at 557–58 
83. Justice Scalia’s explanation of his proposed replacement for the City of Boerne test is an 
unusually explicit discussion of the process by which a Justice reaches a doctrinal position. See id. 
at 561–65 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Court itself, as a corporate body, does admit to error of this sort with 
some frequency, but as a matter of fact such shifts in interpretation 
usually reflect changes in the Court’s membership rather than in the 
individual Justices’ mindsets. 
The doctrinal gap between the Court’s articulation of the case law that 
implements the Constitution, and the Justices’ often conflicting views on 
the meaning of the Constitution itself, marks for most purposes the 
boundary between the domain of legal arguments that might plausibly 
lead to a change in the Court’s position, and that area in which the 
Justices’ commitments to their vision of constitutional principle are too 
deep to change. In the realm of doctrine, the presence of strategic 
considerations makes constitutional law fluid, flexible, and open to the 
sorts of change and adjustment that Chief Justice Rehnquist called “a 
normal part of constitutional law.”84 On the other hand, the latter realm 
of principled commitment to underlying constitutional meaning is 
relatively static, fixed by the divergent visions of individual Justices that 
are shaped largely by what the great Chief Justice John Marshall called 
“the wishes, the affections, and the general theories” of the individual.85 
Because such factors are far more deeply a part of the individual, they 
are far less susceptible to change.86 Where there is little or no doctrinal 
                                                     
84. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000). 
85. JOHN MARSHALL, 4 LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 394 (The Citizens Guild 1926) (1805). 
One of Marshall’s most distinguished successors, Charles Evans Hughes, is reported to have made a 
very similar point: “‘At the constitutional level where we work, ninety percent of any decision is 
emotional. The rational part of us supplies the reasons for supporting our predilections.’” WILLIAM 
O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939 TO 1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 
8 (Random House ed., 1980) (quoting Charles Evans Hughes). 
86. Individual Justices (and other constitutionalists) differ not only in the substance of their 
commitments but in the range of constitutional issues about which they hold fixed as opposed to 
fluid views. Justices who have relatively small areas of constitutional law in which they have deep 
commitments about underlying meaning, or whose commitments are more complex (or confused, 
according to their critics), notoriously can enjoy a disproportionate sway over the Court’s outcomes 
because far more cases end up for them on the flexible, fluid side of the doctrinal gap. One thinks of 
Justice Powell on the Burger Court, Justice O’Connor on the Rehnquist Court, and, perhaps, Justice 
Kennedy on the Roberts Court. Commentators tend to lump such “swing-vote” Justices together as 
exemplars of a common characteristic, with the commentators divided over whether the Justices’ 
behavior is admirably judicious or hopelessly inconsistent. See, e.g., Douglas M. Parker, Justice 
Kennedy: The Swing Voter and His Critics, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 317 (2008) (discussing claims that 
Justice Kennedy is inconsistent); C. Lincoln Combs, A Curious Choice: Hibbs v. Winn as a Case 
Study of Sandra Day O’Connor’s Balancing Jurisprudence, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 192 (2005) 
(“Justice O’Connor’s jurisprudential style has been called many things: accommodationist, 
marginalist, pragmatic, inconsistent, and unpredictable. Perhaps the best way to describe her judicial 
analysis is ‘balancing.’”); Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The 
Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1 (1987) (arguing that “Powell’s balancing approach 
confused the role of juror and Justice, the role of legislator and Justice, and ultimately the role of 
citizen and Justice”). My own view is that the mere fact that a Justice seems often to be the “swing 
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gap between the Court’s approach to deciding particular issues and the 
Justices’ underlying constitutional commitments, precedent tends to be 
brittle—hard and unyielding insofar as it commands five votes, while 
susceptible to unconvincing “application” or simple repudiation when it 
lacks, or loses, a consistent majority. 
IV. DOCTRINAL DECISIONS AND EXTRAJUDICIAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
The distinction between constitutional doctrine and the commands of 
the Constitution that doctrine is meant to implement is not only 
important for its role in the Court’s dealings with its own precedents. It 
is equally or even more important for the part it plays in defining the role 
of the political branches of government as constitutional interpreters. 
Footnote 27’s reconstruction of the relationship between rational-basis 
scrutiny and the underlying constitutional rule has profound implications 
for the role of the political branches in the implementation of the 
Constitution: the footnote implicitly discards one of the most important 
points in contemporary constitutional law where political-branch 
implementation can play a role.87 
A. The Non-Exclusivity of the Judicial Power to “Say What 
(Constitutional) Law Is” 
In theory at least, it would be possible to treat the Constitution as the 
concern solely of the judiciary. Other governmental actors (legislatures, 
high executive officers, administrators, police officers) would be 
normatively free to do whatever they thought best, with the Constitution 
and the judiciary’s enforcement of it as solely a matter of external 
constraint. On this view, if other governmental actors (legislature, 
executive, etc.) can get away with X without interference from the 
courts, the Constitution itself should give them no other pause: it is the 
                                                     
vote” says little in itself other than that the Court is polarized over issues about which the Justice in 
question often does not have a broad and unyielding commitment on the question of underlying 
constitutional meaning. 
87. I am not concerned in this Article with the related but distinct issue of the executive branch’s 
obligation to enforce federal-court judgments even when the Executive conscientiously believes that 
the court is in error. While that question is apparently of great interest to scholars, see, for example, 
William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807 (2008), I believe that it is settled, and 
rightly so, as a matter of judicial and executive practice. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY 
BUILT ON WORDS 127 (2003) (referring to the almost “unbroken tradition of executive branch 
implementation of judicial decisions”); id. at 207 (“American executive officers must obey judicial 
orders, at least once affirmed at the highest level.”). 
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judges’ concern, not theirs. Some people think the American system was 
designed this way, and many more believe (or fear) that it is the 
American norm in practice.88 From this perspective, the Constitution 
stands to governmental officials, other than judges, roughly as the 
Internal Revenue Code does to taxpayers. There are rules that the 
taxpayer must not transgress, on pain of external sanction, but as long as 
he stays within those rules the taxpayer owes no further regard to the 
purposes of the Code. As Judge Learned Hand wrote, “Any one may so 
arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not 
bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is 
not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”89 The Code imposes no 
internal obligations. 
On the analogous view of the Constitution, governmental officials 
(except judges—but why are they different?) owe nothing to the 
Constitution for its own sake, except the duty to obey judicial orders 
issued in the Constitution’s name (but, again, why?). The domain of 
politics and the domain of constitutional principle have only one 
necessary point of contact: the constitutional domain sets bounds on the 
political branches. Beyond respecting orders policing that boundary, 
political decisionmakers may simply ignore the Constitution and its 
judicial guardians. There is no need for political actors to interpret the 
Constitution or concern themselves independently with its 
implementation. The only constitutional advice a lawyer could really 
give a legislator or executive officer would be a prediction about 
whether the courts would interfere, and if so what the courts would be 
likely to do. This perspective treats non-judicial officials as if they were 
supposed to behave like Holmes’s famous Bad Man, interested only in 
predicting what penalties, if any, their conduct might incur.90 
The Constitution as an “Internal Revenue Code” dovetails nicely with 
the U.S. Supreme Court as a constitutional oracle, a position usually 
associated, perhaps unfairly, with the opinion in Cooper v. Aaron.91 
Cooper, signed by all nine Justices, famously asserted: 
[T]he interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated 
by this Court in the Brown [v. Board of Education] case is the 
supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes 
                                                     
88. For a recent searching discussion of this subject in the context of habeas corpus suspension, 
see Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1533 
(2007). 
89. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934) (Hand, J.), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
90. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). 
91. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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it of binding effect on the States ‘any Thing in the Constitution 
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’”92 
If the political branches of government have no role in determining the 
meaning and implementation of the Constitution, those activities fall by 
default into judicial hands and, given the hierarchical nature of the 
American judiciary, that means the Supreme Court of the United States. 
There is no mystery about the obligation to give Miranda warnings or 
desegregate schools; the Court’s decisions define both as constitutional 
obligations, period. With regard to whatever the Court deems to be a 
constitutional matter, its views exhaustively address any questions. 
There is no normative space, as it were, for political actors to interpret 
the Constitution or concern themselves with its implementation beyond 
obeying court orders, for to do so would be to usurp the exclusive role of 
the judiciary.93 Judicial enforcement defines constitutional obligation. 
As a historical matter, however, this perspective on the Constitution is 
clearly not the best understanding of the American constitutional 
tradition. At the simplest level, it implies an eviscerated view of the 
constitutional oath required of all American governmental officers that 
directly contradicts part of the reasoning by which John Marshall 
defended the power of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison.94 There 
are those who believe that the oath is nothing more than a pledge of 
allegiance to the American political system,95 but the mainstream view 
has been that legislators and executive officials have an independent 
duty to interpret and implement the Constitution.96 Evidence to this 
effect is not difficult to find: City of Boerne aimed to curb congressional 
overzealousness in promoting legislative views of the Constitution’s 
                                                     
92. Id. at 18. In the context of Cooper, the Justices’ immediate point was to reject the legitimacy 
of any attempt by state governmental officials to interfere with federal-court desegregation orders 
and perhaps they meant only the point Dickerson was to make decades later, that political actors 
cannot “supersede [the Court’s] decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution,” except of 
course through the amendment process. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000). 
93. Obviously someone holding this view would need to nuance it considerably to address such 
practical issues as constitutional questions not yet addressed by the judiciary, situations in which it 
might seem clear what the courts would rule but unclear that any court would actually be able to 
entertain a case allowing a ruling, and the interpretation of ambiguities in judicial decisions. We can 
leave to one side these issues for resolution by the advocates of an imperial judiciary. 
94. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
95. On this issue, see H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE 3–6 (2008). 
96. See Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 
199, 200 (1994) (“There will be some occasions [when] the President can and should exercise his 
independent judgment to determine whether the statute is constitutional.”). 
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meaning.97 In doing so, however, the Court stated its respect for 
Congress’s exercise of the authority to construe and apply the 
Constitution: 
In 1789, when a Member of the House of Representatives 
objected to a debate on the constitutionality of legislation based 
on the theory that “it would be officious” to consider the 
constitutionality of a measure that did not affect the House, 
James Madison explained that “it is incontrovertibly of as much 
importance to this branch of the Government as to any other, 
that the constitution should be preserved entire. It is our duty.”98 
President Madison took the same view of the executive branch’s relation 
to the Constitution,99 but this observation does not depend on his 
admittedly huge stature as a constitutionalist. From the beginning, the 
almost universal acceptance by Americans of judicial review has gone 
hand-in-hand with a widespread understanding that other governmental 
officials have a duty to govern themselves by the Constitution and not 
merely to avoid constitutional entanglements with the courts. 
B. Doctrinal Underenforcement of the Constitution 
What this Article calls the “doctrinal gap,” the distinction between the 
doctrines that the judiciary follows in its exercise of judicial review and 
the commands of the Constitution in itself, is a primary source of the 
normative space in which political actors can and should undertake their 
own task of constitutional review (or self-review).100 For example, 
                                                     
97. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (“City of Boerne also 
confirmed . . . that it falls to this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional 
guarantees. . . . We distinguish appropriate prophylactic legislation from ‘substantive redefinition of 
the Fourteenth Amendment right at issue’ by applying the test set forth in City of Boerne.” (citation 
omitted)). 
98. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 521, 535 (1997) (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 500 (1789)). 
99. See H. Jefferson Powell, Law as a Tool, in LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 
250–64 (H. Jefferson Powell & James Boyd White eds. 2009). 
100. This is, to be sure, fully the case only when judicial doctrine falls short of full enforcement 
of the actual constitutional norm. Where, as in the Miranda rule upheld in Dickerson, doctrine limits 
political action beyond what the Constitution itself directly requires, different considerations apply. 
Dickerson and City of Boerne (both of which invalidated acts of Congress passed in direct response 
to constitutional decisions by the Court) make it clear that the Court will not acquiesce in simple 
attempts by Congress to replace in practice the Court’s constitutional views with the legislature’s, 
but it does not follow that there is no normative space for independent political-branch 
constitutional interpretation in situations of judicial “overenforcement.” Miranda expressly 
contemplated the possibility of other, legislatively ordained means for securing the constitutional 
principles at stake other than by the Court’s prescribed warnings. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
467 (1966); see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440–42 (2000) (discussing why the 
congressional response failed to satisfy the Miranda Court’s concerns). Perhaps “the Miranda 
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Congress’s power to spend money, the Court has said, is limited by 
several “general restrictions,” the first of which “is derived from the 
language of the Constitution itself: the exercise of the spending power 
must be in pursuit of ‘the general welfare.’”101 As the Court has noted, 
“The level of deference” that courts must give “to the congressional 
decision [whether an expenditure is for the general welfare] is such that 
the Court has . . . questioned whether ‘general welfare’ is a judicially 
enforceable restriction at all.”102 In fact, while the Court has not gone 
quite so far as to deem the issue a non-justiciable political question,103 
two things are nonetheless clear: the spending power is constitutionally 
limited by the requirement that it serve the general welfare and it is 
Congress (and the President through exercise of the veto power) that is 
primarily charged with the responsibility of enforcing the constitutional 
limitation. Judicial doctrine, which in this area employs a quite sensible 
rule of deference to congressional judgments about what expenditures 
are in the national interest, leaves a very substantial area in which the 
constitutional limitation at issue must be implemented by the political 
branches or else go unobserved. 
The best known argument resting on this observation is probably 
Lawrence Sager’s 1978 article on the judicial underenforcement of 
constitutional norms.104 In contrast to what he viewed as the prevailing 
assumption that “the legal scope of a constitutional norm [is] inevitably 
coterminous with the scope of its federal judicial enforcement,” Dean 
Sager argued that “governmental officials are legally obligated to obey 
the full scope of constitutional norms which are underenforced by the 
federal courts . . . .”105 The Equal Protection Clause, in his view, 
                                                     
Court’s invitation for legislative action,” Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 440, is implicit in any situation 
where the Court announces doctrine that is prophylactic in nature. 
101. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 & n.2 (1987). 
102. Id. 
103. The per curiam opinion in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), arguably reached that 
conclusion. See id. at 90 (“It is for Congress to decide which expenditures will promote the general 
welfare.”). But if so, Dole marked a slight retreat, both in terms of the Court’s language (“courts 
should defer substantially”) and its actions (the Court briefly but substantively considered whether 
the act of Congress under review was “reasonably calculated to advance the general welfare”). 483 
U.S. at 207, 208. 
104. Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). Dean Sager perhaps underestimated the extent to which his 
was in fact an elegant restatement of a long-standing if rather inchoate presupposition of 
mainstream constitutional thought that two other important scholars had already identified. See Paul 
Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 
594–99 (1975); Monaghan, supra note 45. 
105. Sager, supra note 104, at 1213, 1264.   
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provides a clear example of such underenforcement, because the general 
or default doctrine that applies to most equal protection challenges is the 
extremely permissive rational-basis test. Under that test, “only a small 
part of the universe of plausible claims of unequal and unjust treatment 
by government is seriously considered by the federal courts; the vast 
majority of such claims are dismissed out of hand.” In Sager’s view, we 
depend upon “other governmental actors for the preservation of the 
principles embodied in ” the Equal Protection Clause.106 
Dean Sager’s article has been influential,107 and justly so, as a 
powerful interpretation of central aspects of modern equal protection 
doctrine. In doing so, Sager suggested a means for identifying a proper 
role for political-branch constitutional interpretation and 
implementation: Congress and the Executive have a special 
responsibility to safeguard the Constitution’s norms where those norms 
are not or cannot be fully protected by judicial review. As a formal legal 
opinion issued by the Department of Justice in 1996 put it: 
The conclusion that a particular provision of proposed 
legislation probably would not be held unconstitutional by the 
courts is not equivalent to a determination that the legislation is 
constitutional per se. The judiciary is limited, properly, in its 
ability to enforce the Constitution, both by Article III’s 
requirements of jurisdiction and justiciability and by the 
obligation to defer to the political branches in cases of doubt or 
where Congress or the President has special constitutional 
responsibility. In such situations, the executive branch’s regular 
obligation to ensure, to the full extent of its ability, that 
constitutional requirements are respected is heightened by the 
absence or reduced presence of the courts’ ordinary 
guardianship of the Constitution’s requirements.108 
Parallel observations about the constitutional responsibilities of 
Congress and state governments would be equally apposite. The 
                                                     
106. Id. at 1263. Sager cited “the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment [sic], 
particularly in its substantive application,” id. at 1220, as another good example of an underenforced 
norm, presumably because the general or default doctrinal inquiry in substantive due process cases 
is, once again, the rational-basis test. 
107. Professor Fallon—himself a major voice in constitutional scholarship—has recently listed 
Sager’s Fair Measure as one of those “works that are almost universally regarded as being of 
highest quality.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why and How to Teach Federal Courts Today, 53 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 693, 707 (2009). 
108. The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. 
O.L.C. 124, 180 (1996). This opinion was written by the distinguished constitutional scholar Walter 
Dellinger, then serving as the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, 
and thus one of the President’s chief legal advisors. 
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normative space that exists between the Constitution’s actual commands 
and U.S. Supreme Court doctrine that underenforces those commands 
can be, and pursuant to their oaths ought to be, occupied by the 
constitutional decisions of non-judicial officials.109 
C. Williamson v. Lee Optical Is an Example of Judicial 
Underenforcement Through Rational-Basis Scrutiny 
A concrete example of judicial underenforcement through rational-
basis scrutiny is useful at this point. Consider a staple of Constitutional 
Law I classes, Williamson v. Lee Optical. Opticians challenged an 
Oklahoma statute that made it unlawful for anyone other than a licensed 
optometrist or ophthalmologist “to fit lenses to a face or to duplicate or 
replace into frames lenses or other optical appliances, except upon 
written prescriptive authority of an Oklahoma licensed ophthalmologist 
or optometrist.”110 The district court concluded that because the law 
“prohibit[ed] the wearers of eyeglasses from exchanging their frames 
either to obtain more modern designs or because the former frames are 
broken, without first visiting an ophthalmologist or optometrist, ” the 
law’s practical effect was to “divert[] from the optician a very 
substantial, as well as profitable, part of his business.”111 Because “the 
knowledge necessary to perform these services is strictly artisan in 
character and can skillfully and accurately be performed without the 
professional knowledge and training essential to qualify as a licensed 
optometrist or ophthalmologist,” the district court held that the statute 
was “unreasonable and discriminatory” and violated both the Due 
Process and the Equal Protection Clauses.112 
                                                     
109. Dean Sager believed that state courts should be included in the list of constitutional actors 
with the duty and authority to act in the doctrinal gap created by federal-court underenforcement. 
Sager, supra note 104, at 1242–63. The U.S. Supreme Court appears to have rejected that view. See, 
e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 n.6 (1981) (“[W]hen a state court 
reviews state legislation challenged as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not free to 
impose greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law than this Court has imposed.”). 
Whether the Court was right to do so is beyond the scope of this Article. 
110. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 485 (1955). The case also involved a separate 
claim by an ophthalmologist who challenged a section of the statute that prohibited kickbacks and 
related conduct. The district court rejected his claim, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, and no one 
today has any interest in that part of the decision. I have passed over other details that, like the out-
of-luck ophthalmologist’s argument, are of no current concern. 
111. Lee Optical v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128, 135 (D.C. Okla. 1954) (three-judge court), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
112. Id. at 135, 139. 
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The district court clearly thought the statute was what later economic 
jargon would term rent-seeking legislation, a successful attempt by the 
ophthalmologists and optometrists to appropriate part of the opticians’ 
business through manipulation of the legislative process, with no public-
focused purpose at all.113 The conclusion that, on those facts, the law 
was invalid seems entirely defensible, at least on the assumption that 
statutory classifications and intrusions on liberty must serve some 
legitimate public purpose.114 
A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court reversed in an opinion written by 
Justice Douglas. The Court was not in the dark about the unmistakable 
economic effect, and no doubt the sub rosa intended purpose of the 
instigators, of the law under review.115 Indeed, it hardly requires a close 
reading of his text to sense that Douglas drafted his opinion to protect 
the Court, or himself, from any charge of naïveté. “The Oklahoma law 
may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases,” Douglas 
conceded, but added: 
The legislature might have concluded that [situations where it is 
not are common enough] to justify this regulation of the fitting 
of eyeglasses. . . . [T]he legislature might have concluded that 
[an examination by an ophthalmologist or optometrist] was 
needed often enough to require one in every case. . . . To be 
                                                     
113. See Chris M. Franchetti, Not Seeing Eye to Eye: Chapter 8 and the Battle Over Prescription 
Eyewear, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 474, 475–76 (1999) (“[T]he optical industry, understandably, is 
highly competitive. However, as partially evidenced by the infamous controversy which gave rise to 
Williamson v. Lee Optical in 1955, such vigorous competition may be less than healthy. For 
decades, various industry participants have battled for control of eyewear sales, producing 
government investigations, lawsuits, and allegedly unethical political influence in the process.”). 
114. The Court of the 1950s accepted this principle. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 
499–500 (1954) (“Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free 
to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective.”). 
115. Justice Douglas himself was an experienced observer of business behavior and highly 
unlikely to have been in doubt about the nature of the Oklahoma law. In any case, the opticians 
made the point starkly clear:  
The undisputed record evidence clearly establishes that optometrists in Oklahoma and 
elsewhere are in direct competition with opticians in the sale of eyeglasses, frames and lenses, 
and because of their economic dependence upon the sale of those articles, the merchandising 
interests of the optometrist play a dominant part in the establishment of their professional 
objectives and activities. . . . The direct effect of [the law] is to transfer from the optician to the 
optometrist a large and profitable portion of the former’s business. [It] contains no regulations 
or standards for opticians but rather is a discriminatory statute that arbitrarily takes from the 
optician a major portion of his lawful business. . . . all the evidence introduced demonstrates 
that the fitting, adjusting and duplication of eyeglasses by opticians is not an “evil” and that the 
prohibitions contained in [the law] have no real and substantial relationship to the announced 
purpose of the act—the protection of the public’s health and welfare. 
Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 20, 24, 51, Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) 
(Nos. 184 & 185). 
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sure, the present law does not [actually require this,]  . . . . [b]ut 
the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its 
aims to be constitutional.116 
The discussion is, intellectually, entirely in the subjunctive, a matter of 
theoretical possibilities with no relationship to the opticians’ factual 
claim that the law was simply a means of transferring much of the 
opticians’ business to their competitors.117 
Justice Douglas’s statement of why this exercise in legal fantasy was 
sufficient to decide the case was very brief: “The day is gone when this 
Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, 
because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a 
particular school of thought.”118 And with that exercise in non-
explanation, the Court, almost certainly knowing what it was doing, 
allowed one side in an economic competition for profits to manipulate 
the competitive playing field through legislation, to the likely detriment 
of everyone in Oklahoma except the successful interest group.119 As we 
know, however, the Court had a reason for its decision, one that had 
nothing to do with eyeglasses or interest groups: the Justices’ desire to 
make unmistakably clear their repudiation of the vigorous protection of 
economic liberty through the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
associated with Lochner v. New York.120 
For veterans of the New Deal battle over judicial supremacy such as 
Justice Douglas, Lochner was the paradigm of a Court utterly forgetful 
of its duty to observe the limits on its own power and of the respect it 
                                                     
116. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487–88 (emphasis added) (rejecting the due process claim); see also 
id. at 489 (rejecting the equal protection claim on similarly hypothetical grounds). 
117. See Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 52, Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) 
(Nos. 184 & 185) (“Rather, it is the law that deprives opticians of a substantial portion of their 
business, which deprived portion of the opticians’ business is transferred to optometrists or else 
channeled into the hands of a few opticians who possess the favor of ophthalmologists.”). 
118. 348 U.S. at 488. 
119. See Franchetti, supra note 113, at 489 (“[F]or optometrists nationwide, the case represented 
a significant early victory in the optical-industry battle. It confirmed that the activities of the 
profession’s primary eyewear-sales competitors could be controlled by statute without violating the 
federal constitution.”). As indicated in the text, before Heller it seemed likely that the last words in 
the parenthetical quotation should actually have read “without inference by courts on federal 
constitutional grounds.” 
120. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 481, 559 n.326 (2004) (“[Williamson’s] deferential posture grew explicitly out of the shadow 
of Lochner.”). 
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owes the legislative function.121 The New Deal cure for the disease of 
Lochner was to redraft, or redirect, constitutional doctrine so that courts 
would, at least in most circumstances, give legislatures the widest 
possible scope for their lawmaking decisions. As the Court put it, shortly 
after the 1937 shift, “Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle 
of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the 
legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.”122 
The extraordinarily deferential form of judicial review that the Court 
employed in Williamson, and that it adheres to in modern rational-basis 
cases such as Beach Communications,123 springs out of this prophylactic 
or strategic intention. It is doctrine, crafted to prevent one constitutional 
actor, the judiciary itself, from violating however innocently the 
constitutional norms we collectively describe as the separation of 
powers. The Court replaced a paradigm of judicial overreaching with 
what Justice Thomas in Beach Communications termed “a paradigm of 
judicial restraint.”124 
1. The Doctrinal Gap in Williamson 
Where there is a doctrinal gap, judicial doctrine is, by definition, 
either overenforcing or underenforcing an actual constitutional norm for 
strategic reasons. In the context of Williamson there is, of course, no 
possibility that the Court is following a rule that is more stringent than 
the commands of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 
Williamson-style rational-basis review is virtually toothless.125 As soon 
as one recalls the traditional, prophylactic justification for rational-basis 
scrutiny, it becomes obvious that there probably is a doctrinal gap 
between the Court’s deferential standard of review and the constitutional 
principle (usually due process or equal protection) the Court is 
enforcing. The justification of a need to respect the legislative function, 
after all, does not speak in terms of the substance of those principles. 
                                                     
121. Whether this was entirely fair to the Justices associated with Lochner is beside the point for 
present purposes: I shall use “Lochner” and “the New Deal [Court]” to stand, conventionally and 
respectively, for the Court’s uneven protection of economic liberty prior to 1937 and its almost 
complete retreat from such protection beginning in that year. 
122. Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 510 (1937). 
123. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307 (1993); see supra text accompanying note 57. 
124. Id. at 314 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 (1979)). 
125. See, e.g., Sheldon Gelman, “Life” and “Liberty”: Their Original Meaning, Historical 
Antecedents, and Current Significance in the Debate over Abortion Rights, 78 MINN. L. REV. 585, 
604 (1994) (describing Williamson as “employing a particularly toothless version of the rational 
basis test”). 
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Indeed, the constitutional commands that the Court’s justification 
appears to have in view concern separation of powers and the negative 
implications of the federal judiciary’s limitation to the exercise of the 
“judicial power” in specifically enumerated cases and controversies. By 
the Court’s own reasoning, then, it would be in a sense coincidental if 
the self-restraint driven doctrine of deferential rational-basis scrutiny 
produced the same operational rule as the substantive requirements of 
due process and equal protection—and of course all the cases in which 
the Court does not employ rational-basis review in implementing those 
requirements make it seem very unlikely that there is such a coincidence. 
The rational-basis test of Williamson is, as Dean Sager argued, most 
likely an example of judicial underenforcement. We should not read 
Justice Douglas’s opinion, therefore, as concluding that the legislation 
under review—an unabashed exercise in rent-seeking without any 
public-regarding purpose, as the district court (the trier of fact) found it 
to be—actually treated similarly situated parties similarly, or restricted 
the opticians’ liberty for some legitimate governmental purpose. All 
Justice Douglas, or the Court, actually announced was that under the 
judiciary’s limited form of review, self-imposed out of respect for the 
legislature, the Court could not hold the statute unconstitutional. Justice 
Douglas’s language suggested as much: “The prohibition of the Equal 
Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination. We 
cannot say that that point has been reached here. . . . [f]or all this record 
shows.”126 On this reading of his language, Justice Douglas deliberately 
offered any judgment about whether the statute was unconstitutional in 
principle, apart from judicial deference. It would be possible in theory to 
conclude that the consequence of the Court’s strategic underenforcement 
is simply to leave the constitutional question in principle unanswered. 
But another rhetorical strand in the Court’s explanation for its deference 
to the legislature implies that Dean Sager is right, and judicial 
underenforcement triggers the legal obligation on the part of non-judicial 
government officials “to obey an underenforced constitutional 
norm . . . beyond its interpretation by the federal judiciary to the full 
dimensions of the concept which the norm embodies.”127 For the New 
Deal Court, Justice Holmes was an iconic figure, and the Justices of that 
era were well aware that in addition to his general attitude of deference, 
Holmes had written in Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. May128 
                                                     
126. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (emphasis added).   
127. Sager, supra note 104, at 1227. 
128. 194 U.S. 267 (1904). 
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that “it must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of 
the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the 
courts.”129 As Sager himself noted in his article, the May passage 
indicates that Holmes was an adherent to Sager’s thesis avant la lettre: 
“Holmes, I think . . . meant quite literally that the legislatures were to be 
regarded as guardians of the liberties of the people—including and 
especially those enshrined in the Constitution—above the power of the 
Supreme Court to enforce those same liberties.”130 
It is plausible that Douglas and his colleagues in Williamson explicitly 
thought that the gap between a less restrictive rational-basis doctrine and 
a more restrictive constitutional command was supposed to be filled by 
the legislature’s own conscientious respect for the command.131 The 
Court expressly stated this expectation in a different doctrinal context at 
the very dawn of its New Deal era. Discussing the Constitution’s 
limitation of Congress’s spending power to expenditures for the general 
welfare, Justice Cardozo wrote in 1937: 
The line must still be drawn between one welfare and another, 
between particular and general. Where this shall be placed 
cannot be known through a formula in advance of the event. 
There is a middle ground or certainly a penumbra in which 
discretion is at large. The discretion, however, is not confided to 
the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice 
is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of 
judgment. This is now familiar law.132 
The norm that federal spending must serve the general welfare (or 
common defense) is a constitutional command; the judgment of which 
Cardozo wrote is a constitutional judgment as to the purpose and effect 
of congressional expenditures and Congress’s discretion in enacting 
spending legislation included the duty and authority to exercise its own 
judgment on the fit between a spending bill and the constitutional norm. 
One of the primary “constitutional restraints” insuring that Congress will 
observe this norm, then-Justice Stone wrote in a slightly earlier case, is 
                                                     
129. Id. at 270. Justice Douglas quoted the Holmes passage in an opinion in United States v. 
Enmon, 410 U.S. 396, 413 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
130. Sager, supra note 104, at 1227 n.48. 
131. The relevant passage from Justice Holmes’s opinion in May appears in several opinions 
written before Williamson by Justices who shared the New Deal rejection of Lochner. See United 
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 319 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Perkins v. Lukens Steel 
Co., 310 U.S. 113, 131 (1940) (majority opinion of Black, J.); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 
87 (1936) (Stone, J., joined by Brandeis & Cardozo, JJ., dissenting). 
132. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937). 
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“the conscience and patriotism of Congress and the Executive”133 
because judicial review of spending legislation ought to be limited to 
what Cardozo called the “display of arbitrary power.” Dean Sager’s 
views on the political branches’ responsibility were orthodox for the 
New Deal Court. 
2. The Implications of Nonjudicial Constitutional Enforcement Under 
the Facts of Williamson 
Justice Douglas’s opinion in Williamson invites speculation about 
how legislative implementation of an underenforced constitutional norm 
might work. Imagine a state legislature debating whether to enact a law 
materially the same as that upheld in Williamson, but in circumstances 
where Holmes’s dictum about legislatures being ultimate guardians of 
the liberties of the people was a live part of legislative discussion. One 
potential topic for deliberation would be the constitutionality under the 
Equal Protection Clause of dividing businesses factually able to fit 
lenses into new frames into ophthalmologists and optometrists (who 
could do so without referring the customer to a different business for a 
required prescription) and opticians (who could not). Williamson would 
make it clear to the legislators that the courts would not invalidate 
legislation making such a distinction, but that would not be the end of 
the constitutional discussion.  Precisely because the judiciary would 
defer to the legislature’s decision, conscientious legislators would find it 
necessary to determine whether the distinction violates equal protection 
for themselves, as a matter of their own constitutional judgment and not 
as a prediction or anticipation of what would happen in court.134 
Looking to the U.S. Supreme Court’s case law not to predict the 
judiciary’s actions but to discern the actual constitutional norm, a 
representative might reason that the underlying norm applicable to his or 
her lawmaking actions in principle is something like the following: 
“[T]he classification ‘must rest upon some ground of difference having a 
                                                     
133. Butler, 297 U.S. at 87 (Stone, J., dissenting). Justices Brandeis and Cardozo joined the 
dissent, which went on vigorously to reject “any assumption that the responsibility for the 
preservation of our institutions is the exclusive concern of any one of the three branches of 
government . . . .” Id. at 87–88. 
134. Sager, supra note 104, at 1227 (“This obligation to obey constitutional norms at their 
unenforced margins requires governmental officials to fashion their own conceptions of these norms 
and measure their conduct by reference to these conceptions. Public officials cannot consider 
themselves free to act at what they perceive or ought to perceive to be peril to constitutional norms 
merely because the federal judiciary is unable to enforce these norms at their margins. At a 
minimum, the obligation of public officials in this context, as in any other, is one of ‘best efforts’ to 
avoid unconstitutional conduct.”) 
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fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation,’” or (put 
differently) must “rest[] upon some reasonable consideration of 
difference or policy . . . .”135 Given factual evidence of the sort presented 
to the Williamson district court, legislators might ask questions about the 
public benefit served by the law, and the fairness and policy of 
excluding opticians from performing services they can provide without 
obvious public detriment. 
We need not indulge an unrealistic romanticism about politicians to 
see potential practical value from such questions in addition to the 
intrinsic rule of law value in public officials acting in accordance with 
their legal duties.136 In some situations, constitutional doubts might in 
fact lead to the defeat of egregious rent-seeking and other substantively 
indefensible bills; in others constitutional opposition to a proposed law 
might lead to improvements in the legislation, or create a legislative 
record making popular repudiation of or judicial intervention against 
improvident or special-interest laws more likely. 
The Constitution does not, of course, guarantee that legislatures will 
make no mistakes or even that they will avoid giving in to political 
pressure. At the same time, as our tradition has interpreted equal 
protection and due process for a very long time, it does guarantee that 
there are significant limits to the extent to which classifications can 
serve selfish concerns or liberty can be impaired without some 
discernible benefit to the common good. If, as Justice Holmes wrote, 
“legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the 
people in quite as great a degree as the courts,”137 the consideration of 
constitutional issues concerning those liberties is an intrinsic part of the 
legislative function, and Dean Sager’s thesis, that the legislature has a 
special responsibility where the federal courts cannot guard 
constitutional liberty, seems very persuasive. 
                                                     
135. See Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959) (citations omitted) (quoting F.S. 
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 
U.S. 563, 573 (1910)). But see U.S.R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174–77 (1980) (discussing 
variations in the Court’s formulation of the rational-basis test). 
136. The Court has observed that an inquiry into the relation between the legislature’s goals and 
its use of classifications is of value to the legislative process. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 
632 (1996) (“The search for the link between classification and objective gives substance to the 
Equal Protection Clause; it provides guidance and discipline for the legislature, which is entitled to 
know what sorts of laws it can pass . . . .”). 
137. Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904). 
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V. HELLER’S FOOTNOTE 27 REPRESENTS A REJECTION OF 
THE STRATEGIC UNDERSTANDING OF RATIONAL-BASIS 
SCRUTINY 
Footnote 27 in Heller overturns the traditional understanding of 
rational-basis review as described above. According to Justice Scalia, 
the rational-basis test is not a strategic doctrine, designed to avoid 
judicial interference with the “rightful independence and . . . ability to 
function”138 of “the legislative branch,”139 as the Court has so often 
indicated.140 At least with respect to equal protection (and there is no 
reason to doubt that he meant to include due process as well),141 the 
footnote indicates that rational-basis inquiry does not underenforce the 
Constitution’s actual commands, as Dean Sager thought. Indeed, the 
rational-basis test is not really judicially crafted doctrine at all, but a 
straightforward restatement of the constitutional norms at issue: 
“rational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used when 
evaluating laws under constitutional commands that are themselves 
prohibitions on irrational laws. In those cases, ‘rational basis’ is not just 
the standard of scrutiny, but the very substance of the constitutional 
guarantee.”142 There is no doctrinal gap: the Court enforces the entirety 
of the constitutional guarantee, which itself extends only to prohibiting 
“irrational laws.” 
We are now in a position to see why footnote 27 is potentially so 
important. First, the footnote annuls all the oft-repeated language, from 
the May case in 1903 to Beach Communications in 1993, describing 
rational basis as grounded in judicial respect for the legislature and 
legislative judgment. By deferring to any rational ground for the 
legislature’s decision, rather than deciding itself whether the 
classification or invasion of liberty was reasonable, the judiciary ensures 
that it does not tread on legislative turf. Taken at face value, footnote 27 
flatly rejects this familiar argument. 
First, according to the footnote, the Court’s application of rational 
basis is not—or at any rate should not be—a strategic act of deference to 
                                                     
138. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake 
Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 365 (1973)). 
139. Id. 
140. See Lehnhausen, 410 U.S. at 365; Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 510 
(1937). 
141. The Court sometimes uses the language of rational basis in other areas of constitutional law. 
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (Commerce Clause). It is clear that Justice Scalia 
did not have those uses of the terminology in mind in writing footnote 27. 
142. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008) (citation omitted). 
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a legislature. According to footnote 27, the Court upholds laws with 
flimsy or ex post facto rationales, with glaring inadequacies in the 
connection between asserted goals and actual means, even with as 
undisguised an unsavory motive as the district court thought apparent in 
Williamson.143 This suggests that the sharp limitations on rational-basis 
scrutiny are not because the Court needs to leave a broad scope for the 
exercise of legislative discretion, or out of the Court’s respect for the 
superior fact-finding or policy-making abilities or responsibilities of the 
legislature. The judicial decision is directly mandated by the 
Constitution because the Constitution itself permits such laws. From the 
perspective announced by footnote 27, it may be true that the 
consequence of the Court enforcing all that the Constitution requires and 
nothing more is to leave room for legislative discretion and all the rest. 
But that consequence is not the reason, or even a reason, for the Court’s 
flaccid level of scrutiny. The explanation of the latter is that rational 
basis is “the very substance of the constitutional guarantee,” and that as 
a result there is nothing else for the Court to enforce. Apparent 
statements to the contrary from Justice Holmes to Justice Thomas were 
all mistakes. 
Second, the footnote is enormously suggestive with respect to existing 
rational-basis precedents. The reader will recall the role that the 
existence of a doctrinal gap plays in constitutional stare decisis: a 
doctrine that is understood, explicitly or not, to incorporate a strategic 
element is in a sense more vulnerable. A Justice can repudiate his or her 
adherence to it without admitting to a serious error in the interpretation 
of the Constitution itself. Justice Scalia’s abandonment of the 
congruence and proportionality test for congressional legislation under 
the Fourteenth Amendment is a good example.144 
On the other hand, if there is little or no distance between the test the 
Court applies and the actual command of the Constitution, precedent 
applying the test is itself more straightforwardly right or wrong, a correct 
application of the Constitution or a flat misconstruction of it. According 
to footnote 27, the latter is the case with rational-basis precedents: those 
cases are direct applications of “the very substance of the constitutional 
guarantee” prohibiting “irrational laws.” There can be in principle no 
laws that the Court upheld—or at least that it should have upheld—that 
are “irrational” in the constitutional sense—whatever Justice Scalia 
means by “irrational,” an issue to which we shall eventually turn. Unless 
                                                     
143. See supra Part IV.C. 
144. See supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text. 
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the Court decided Williamson v. Lee Optical incorrectly, the law there, 
on the facts as found by the district court, satisfies the Constitution’s 
guarantees concerning equal protection and due process. Conversely, 
cases in which the Court invalidated a law using rational-basis scrutiny 
were mistakes if the laws in question were not, constitutionally, 
irrational. 
Footnote 27 could be, therefore, a powerful tool for sorting out the 
Court’s rational-basis case law, a body of decisions that, on any fair 
reckoning, is in a fair state of disarray.145 If the Court is to accept any 
form of stare decisis, the mere fact that a later Justice thinks a decision 
wrong in principle does not require departure from it, but identifying 
error in the basis for the decision is cause for reconsideration of the 
precedential status of a decision. There is one set of rational-basis 
precedents where footnote 27 suggests reconsideration is in order, even 
without delving into the precise meaning of “irrational”: the small and 
motley set of cases in which the Court invalidated a law not because the 
law was literally without reason, but because the Court held the 
government’s reasons to be bad ones.146 These decisions are opaque 
because it is hard to explain why the Court looks behind the ex post 
facto rationalizations it usually swallows. 
On an underenforcement understanding of rational-basis scrutiny, 
however, the decisions make perfect sense in substance. It is always the 
law of the Constitution that bad purposes render a classification (or a 
restriction on liberty) unconstitutional: constitutional rationality requires 
not only that the official action make sense as a means toward some 
governmental end but that the end itself be legitimate, which is a 
normative judgment.147 As the Court observed in an opinion joined by 
                                                     
145. See, e.g., Cent. State Univ. v. Am. Assoc. of Univ. Profs., 526 U.S. 124, 132–33 & n.3 
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing implications of fact that “[c]ases applying the rational-
basis test have described that standard in various ways” that are inconsistent). 
146. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (state interest in enforcing 
majority’s moral views insufficient); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996); Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (as-applied decision); Williams v. Vermont, 472 
U.S. 14, 22–24 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202, 227–30 (1982); Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533–35 (1973); Levy v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1968). This list is neither exhaustive nor indisputable: the Court is 
not always clear what standard it is applying. 
147. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (noting as a statement of an 
“unremarkable and widely acknowledged tenet of this Court’s equal protection jurisprudence” an 
earlier statement that “negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly 
cognizable . . . are not permissible bases” for governmental discrimination (quoting Cleburne, 473 
U.S. at 448)); Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (“[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the 
laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. 
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Justice Scalia, under “the usual rational-basis test: if a statute is not 
rationally related to any legitimate governmental objective, it cannot be 
saved from constitutional challenge by a defense that relates it to an 
illegitimate governmental interest.”148 
Most of the time, the value of judicial deference in preventing judicial 
overreaching makes it inappropriate for the courts to engage in the sort 
of intrusive review of legislative action necessary to catch legislation 
with bad purposes. But when a court, as it were, stumbles across a bad 
legislative purpose, no strategic purpose would be served in ignoring the 
fact, and it becomes the court’s constitutional duty to invalidate the law. 
The mistake the district court judges made in Williamson was that the 
scrutiny they applied to the handiwork of the Oklahoma Legislature was 
insufficiently respectful of the latter’s constitutional dignity and role. On 
the constitutional merits, the district court may have been entirely 
correct. In contrast, from the perspective advanced by footnote 27, the 
district court judges in Williamson were simply wrong in principle if the 
Oklahoma law was not “irrational” constitutionally—or they were right 
and the U.S. Supreme Court made a mistake in reversing them. The bad-
purpose cases in which the High Court has invalidated official decisions 
on that ground were right only if those actions were irrational in a sense 
that the many laws and other actions the Court has upheld were not. 
Justice Scalia’s underlying logic in footnote 27 leads to the conclusion 
that the bad-purpose cases were all mistakes, because the category of 
                                                     
at 534)); Lyng v. Int’l Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 370 n.8 (1988) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 
533–34); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446–47 (“[S]ome objectives—such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group,’—are not legitimate state interests.” (citation omitted) (quoting 
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534)); N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 n.40 (1979) (noting 
“classifications drawn ‘with an evil eye and an unequal hand’ or motivated by ‘a feeling of 
antipathy’ against, a specific group” violate equal protection (citations omitted) (quoting Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886)); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975) (stating 
that “of course Congress may not invidiously discriminate . . . on the basis of a ‘bare congressional 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group’” but must use “criteria” that have a rational relation to 
a “legitimate legislative goal” (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534)); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534. In 
Beazer, 440 U.S. at 593 n.40, the Court traced the requirement of a legitimate governmental purpose 
back to Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884). See Barbier, 113 U.S. at 32 (holding that equal 
protection prohibits “[c]lass legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others,” but 
permits “legislation which [] carr[ies] out a public purpose”). 
148. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 370 n.8. My point is not to criticize Justice Scalia for inconsistency (Lyng 
was long ago and decided early in his time on the Court), but to underline the ordinary and (one 
would have thought) uncontroversial nature of the proposition that constitutional rationality, which 
requires at least the hypothetical presence of a “legitimate” governmental interest or purpose, has a 
normative component. The Court has not treated public rationality as limited to a mere logical 
connection between means and ends. 
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“irrational laws” does not encompass them. In any event, without further 
explanation they are even more anomalous than before. 
Third, footnote 27 entirely collapses Dean Sager’s underenforcement 
thesis with respect to rational-basis scrutiny. In doing so, it eviscerates 
the corollary he drew of a constitutional duty on the part of other 
governmental officials to implement constitutional norms that judicial 
doctrine left underenforced for strategic reasons. It would be quite 
wrong for a legislator to oppose a Williamson-like bill on the ground that 
the legislator thought it violated equal protection, at least along the lines 
outlined earlier, or for that matter for a governor to veto the bill because 
the governor similarly thought it unconstitutional. If the bill would pass 
judicial rational-basis scrutiny, then there is no federal constitutional 
argument that it is nevertheless a violation of equal protection, because 
the whole substance of equal protection is a prohibition on irrational 
laws, and irrational laws are those that fail rational-basis examination. In 
the world of footnote 27, there is no normative gap between 
constitutional command and judicial doctrine that is to be filled, or even 
can be filled, by the conscientious application of constitutional norms by 
non-judicial officials. Footnote 27 leaves the domain of politics wider, in 
the sense that under it fewer possible laws would be unconstitutional in 
principle. But it does so by making the domain of politics much 
narrower in another way, stripped of any special role in constitutional 
implementation. 
Implicit in footnote 27 is a vision of the relationship between politics 
and the Constitution that we have already considered: the Constitution as 
analogue to the Internal Revenue Code, with the political branches of 
government in the position of taxpayers “obligated” to obey the 
Constitution only in the sense of being subject to external sanctions for 
violations of the rules that the external authority (the courts in the case 
of the Constitution) enforces.149 For Justice Scalia, presumably, this is 
the arrangement that the Constitution itself ordains and that American 
constitutional practice has traditionally respected. This arrangement is, 
however, demonstrably in error about the tradition. Whether he is 
nevertheless right about what the Constitution ordains when it is 
properly interpreted depends on other considerations. As the Court noted 
in City of Boerne, Madison argued in the First Congress that “it is 
incontrovertibly of as much importance to this branch of the 
Government as to any other, that the constitution should be preserved 
                                                     
149. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
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entire. It is our duty.”150 From Madison’s perspective, which is surely 
correct, the implementation of the Constitution is “the province and 
duty” of the political branches just as much as it is that of the judiciary, 
even if they carry out that responsibility through different means and, 
generally, with respect for the finality of judicial decisions. By drawing 
a sharp line between the domain of political freedom and the domain of 
constitutional principle, footnote 27 undermines Madison’s principle.151 
 There is a fourth way in which footnote 27 is potentially far-
reaching, although it is not as clear as with the first three points that this 
implication is fairly attributable to the footnote. As noted earlier, Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Dickerson appeared to reject altogether the legitimacy 
of judge-made doctrine that imposes stricter limitations on political 
action than the Constitution’s norms necessarily require, “in the sense” 
(as Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote) “that nothing else will suffice to 
satisfy constitutional requirements.”152 Footnote 27 does not address 
strategic, overenforcing or prophylactic judicial doctrine, of course, and 
Justice Scalia has written or joined opinions in cases besides Dickerson 
that appear to take a somewhat less draconian position on overenforcing 
doctrines. Nevertheless, putting the Dickerson dissent (no over-
enforcing doctrine) together with footnote 27 (rational basis, the usual 
paradigm of an underenforcing doctrine, is nonetheless not an 
underenforcing doctrine) suggests a consistent, if intellectually radical, 
perspective: all constitutional doctrine is, in principle, illegitimate. 
On its face, judicial overenforcement, which narrows political action 
more than the Constitution does per se, is quite different from judicial 
underenforcement, which expands the range of possible political 
                                                     
150. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 521, 535 (1997) (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 500 
(1789)); supra text accompanying note 98. 
151. I should note an ostensible exception. Justice Scalia appears to think, rightly I believe, that at 
least some of the time, a decision that an issue poses a non-justiciable political question means not 
that there is no legal rule applicable, but that the Constitution leaves the implementation of the rule 
to a non-judicial actor. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) (plurality opinion of 
Scalia, J.) (“Sometimes, however, the law is that the judicial department has no business 
entertaining the claim of unlawfulness—because the question is entrusted to one of the political 
branches or involves no judicially enforceable rights.”); id. at 292 (“The issue we have discussed is 
not whether severe partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution, but whether it is for the courts to 
say when a violation has occurred, and to design a remedy.”). This exception is partial as well as 
rare: application of the political question doctrine means only that some non-judicial decisionmaker 
has some small area of responsibility for making law-like decisions in addition to its usual, political 
role. 
152. Compare Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000) (majority opinion of 
Rehnquist, C.J.), with id. at 461 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting what he described as “the power of 
the Supreme Court to write a prophylactic, extraconstitutional Constitution, binding on Congress 
and the States”). 
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decisions. Both however are strategic in nature and create a doctrinal gap 
between judicial decision and constitutional command. Furthermore, 
when adopted deliberately, both over- and underenforcement depend on 
an understanding of constitutional law that is inconsistent with the 
existence of a sharp-edged distinction between constitutional and 
political decisions. Underenforcement presupposes political-branch 
constitutional implementation while overenforcement assumes the 
legitimacy of judicial decisions that involve strategic considerations that 
are, at least in a broad sense, political in nature. Justice Scalia’s extra-
judicial writings strongly suggest that that he views all judicial doctrine 
in constitutional matters as illegitimate. The Constitution, he appears to 
think, consists of rules, constitutional law should implement those rules, 
no more and no less, and all the rest of governmental action is subject to 
what we might call “aconstitutional” political decisionmaking—political 
choice unconstrained by constitutional considerations outside the 
judicially enforced rules.153 This view is, perhaps, a theoretically 
defensible position, and as a verbal matter at least, it has an illustrious 
pedigree.154 
But it clearly does not represent the mainstream of American 
constitutional thought or practice, which is resolutely doctrinal.155 There 
is nothing surprising about finding Justice Scalia taking a radical stance 
toward some feature of contemporary constitutional law that he thinks 
                                                     
153. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 37–41 (1997); Antonin Scalia, 
The Rule of Law As a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1185 (1989). 
154. Thomas Jefferson sometimes made statements that sound as if he was an adherent to a form 
of constitutional literalism. See, for example, his famous letter to Wilson C. Nicholas: “Our peculiar 
security is in possession of a written Constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by construction.” 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in 8 The Writings of 
Thomas Jefferson 247 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1897); see also H. 
Jefferson Powell, The Principles of ‘98: An Essay in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REV. 689 
(1994) (discussing the role of textualism in Jeffersonian constitutionalism). In a more recent era, 
Justice Black’s self-professed literalism comes immediately to mind. 
155. See generally CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS (2004), which is an elegant 
account of and (in the main) apology for contemporary constitutional doctrine. Professor (and 
former Justice) Fried puts the inevitability of doctrine more strongly: “The Constitution’s text must 
be mediated by doctrine before it can yield decision.” Id. at 3. There may also be areas of justiciable 
constitutional controversy where the underlying norm can be implemented rather directly. See, e.g., 
DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF 
AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 300–01 (2009) (defending an absolutist approach to free speech 
protection under the First Amendment). As a general matter, however, I think that anti-doctrinalism 
in the name of the constitutional text has been more a rhetorical trope (and a powerful one) for its 
most prominent proponents. See id. at 239–60 (reading Justice Black’s First Amendment absolutism 
as based in fact on a structural vision of constitutional institutions rather than simply on the words 
of the provision); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS 11–21 (2003) 
(discussing an example of Jefferson going beyond the text in answering a constitutional question). 
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wayward,156 but institutions tend to be conservative with respect to their 
practices. Whatever Justice Scalia may think, it does not follow that the 
rest of the Justices in the Heller majority intended to endorse a position 
that is, at most, only partially to be found in one of its footnotes, and that 
would mark a sea change from their existing practices. But nothing 
proves that they, or most of them, do not,157 and in any event the 
language in U.S. Supreme Court opinions takes on a life of its own, with 
consequences that are not delimited by the intentions of those who write 
them or join them.158 
If footnote 27 proves to advance any of these four implications, it will 
turn out to be highly significant. There is yet another aspect of the 
footnote, which is still more important, although at a more fundamental 
level. According to the footnote, when the Court uses rational-basis 
scrutiny in enforcing constitutional “guarantees”—in implementing 
equal protection and substantive due process, at the least—the form of 
the Court’s scrutiny is conceptually identical to the substance of the 
constitutional guarantee itself. Rational basis is the test when the 
constitutional command is a prohibition on irrationality in government 
action. In Justice Scalia’s view, only the irrational, as such, is the 
Constitution’s concern when the norms of equal protection and 
substantive due process are invoked, at least in the vast majority of cases 
where government treats someone differently than it does others, or 
                                                     
156. Justice Scalia’s frequent invocation of tradition as a feature of constitutional thought, and 
perhaps the sense that he is, in the evening-news sense, a “conservative,” together tend to obscure 
the fact that he often takes intellectually radical positions on legal and constitutional issues. Patrick 
Brennan’s analysis of Justice Scalia’s overall constitutional approach, which Brennan calls “Scalia’s 
bid for radical reform,” is especially insightful. See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Locating Authority 
in Law, and Avoiding the Authoritarianism of “Textualism,” 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 761, 797 
(2008). The impulse to radical reform is a recurrent and, overall, beneficial element in American 
legal change and to observe that someone is taking a radical position in (or on) the law is not 
thereby to criticize him or her but only to identify the relationship of his or her position to those 
generally accepted, at the time or historically. 
157. Justice Kennedy is the only Justice who joined the opinion of the Court in Dickerson who 
was also on the Court and in the majority in Heller. On the basis of Dickerson alone, it is hard to see 
how he could subscribe to the anti-doctrine approach to constitutional law that I believe Justice 
Scalia implied in footnote 27. As Justice Kennedy’s opinions in City of Boerne and Croson show, 
he does not oppose the overt consideration of strategic factors in shaping doctrine. See City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 519 
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); supra text accompanying notes 51–52. 
158. As Professor Schauer pointed out years ago, the language of the Court’s opinions has an 
authoritative life of its own. See Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 682, 684 
(1986) (“[T]he words of an opinion take on a canonical role not unlike that played by the words in a 
statute . . . .”). 
04 - Powell Final DTP (SDT).docx (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2011  7:38 PM 
2011] REASONING ABOUT THE IRRATIONAL 261 
 
restricts someone’s liberty.159 This is a very different explanation of the 
test than the strategic rationale that the Court has ordinarily invoked 
since 1937.160 If footnote 27 is adopted more broadly, courts would ask 
only whether a law or other governmental action is sheerly irrational as a 
logical matter, because under the footnote it is only sheer illogic that 
violates the Constitution, and rational-basis scrutiny is not a means of 
according deference to a political actor who may properly have an 
independent view of what makes sense in terms of classification or 
regulation. Footnote 27 invites the reader to wonder what exactly is the 
concept of rationality or irrationality that the footnote identifies as “the 
very substance” of two of the Constitution’s central commands. 
Fortunately, the footnote, although brief, gives a big clue as to what 
Justice Scalia means. We now turn to deciphering what he is telling us. 
VI. FOOTNOTE 27 EMBODIES CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSTITUTION’S 
REQUIREMENT OF RATIONALITY 
Ambiguity is a potent source of confusion in constitutional law, and 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s references to the irrational and its opposite 
often leave the reader uncertain of the Court’s exact meaning. In the case 
of footnote 27, however, Justice Scalia provides a direct and extremely 
useful clue to his view: a citation to an opinion of the Court written by 
Chief Justice Roberts, Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture. In 
Engquist, the Chief Justice provided an unusually clear explanation of 
how he understood the concept of rationality in equal protection 
analysis. Footnote 27’s citation appears to incorporate that explanation 
in the footnote’s assertion about the meaning of constitutional 
irrationality. Ostensibly, that explanation is the understanding footnote 
27 is meant to incorporate. 
A. Engquist Is a Paradigm for the “Irrational” 
Here, again, is the relevant part of footnote 27, with a citation 
restored: 
But rational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used 
when evaluating laws under constitutional commands that are 
                                                     
159. Again, rational-basis scrutiny is the default test under both rubrics. Justice Scalia is, if 
anything, in favor of expanding the range of circumstances in which the Court applies rational basis 
rather than some other form of heightened scrutiny. 
160. See supra Part IV.C. 
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themselves prohibitions on irrational laws. See, e.g., Engquist v. 
Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. —, —, 128 S. Ct. 2146, 
2153–2154 (2008). In those cases, “rational basis” is not just the 
standard of scrutiny, but the very substance of the constitutional 
guarantee.161 
Engquist, which the Court decided seventeen days before Heller, is one 
of “those cases” that illustrate the “very substance of the constitutional 
guarantee.” It is, consequently, a key to footnote 27’s interpretation of 
the Constitution’s ordinary or default norms with respect to substantive 
due process and equal protection. 
Engquist was brought by a former state government employee who 
claimed that her discharge was unlawful for various reasons, among 
them an allegation that she was fired for “arbitrary, vindictive, and 
malicious reasons” (essentially personal animus), quite apart from 
animus toward her sex, race, and national origin, which she also 
alleged.162 This allegation, Engquist argued, stated an equal protection 
class-of-one claim.163 The district court agreed, and she won a jury 
award based in part on the allegation, but the court of appeals reversed, 
holding that the class-of-one theory of equal protection liability does not 
apply to public employers.164 The theory, which the Court recognized as 
cognizable in an earlier decision, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,165 
identifies an equal protection problem in situations where government 
singles out an individual for arbitrary treatment not because of his 
membership in an identifiable class such as race or sex, but on his own, 
as the unique object of official disfavor.166 Relying on cases stressing the 
government’s special role as an employer, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the “class-of-one theory” was inapplicable in that context.167 Other 
federal courts of appeals had sustained class-of-one claims in cases 
arising out of public employment, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve the split among the circuits.168 
                                                     
161. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008). 
162. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 595 (2008) (quoting Engquist’s complaint). 
163. Id. 
164. See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 996 (9th Cir. 2007). 
165. 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam). 
166. See, e.g., Engquist, 553 U.S. at 602 (“[W]hen it appears that an individual is being singled 
out by the government, the specter of arbitrary classification is fairly raised, and the Equal 
Protection Clause requires a ‘rational basis for the difference in treatment.’” (quoting Olech, 528 
U.S. at 564)). 
167. Engquist, 478 F.3d at 994–96. 
168. See, e.g., Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006); Whiting v. Univ. 
of S. Miss., 451 F.3d 339, 348–50 (5th Cir. 2006); Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 
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The high Court affirmed the decision below, holding that the class-of-
one theory should not be allowed in challenges to governmental 
decisions involving public employees.169 Chief Justice Roberts, writing 
for the six-Justice majority, identified a two-part reason for that 
conclusion: one, the Court’s “traditional view of the core concern of the 
Equal Protection Clause as a shield against arbitrary classifications” and, 
two, the “unique considerations applicable when the government acts as 
employer as opposed to sovereign.”170 By “traditional view,” Chief 
Justice Roberts meant that equal protection claims usually arise when 
government “‘create[s] discrete and objectively identifiable classes’” as 
the basis for its discrimination.171 In contrast, the use of class-based 
decisionmaking to subject individuals to discriminatory treatment poses 
the danger of arbitrary distinction between similarly situated 
individuals—what Chief Justice Roberts calls “the specter of arbitrary 
classification.”172 In “traditional” analytical terms, therefore, a “class of 
one” is a figure of speech, but Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the 
class-of-one theory that Olech accepted was “an application of” 
traditional principle rather than “a departure from” it, because in Olech, 
and the cases on which Olech relied, there was “a clear standard [for the 
government action] against which departures, even for a single plaintiff, 
could be readily assessed.”173 
In contrast, in the context of government employment, the Chief 
Justice reasoned, there is no objective standard by which to determine if 
the government has acted arbitrarily, “for employment decisions are 
quite often subjective and individualized, resting on a wide array of 
factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify.”174 The Chief Justice 
continued: 
To treat employees differently is not to classify them in a way 
that raises equal protection concerns. Rather, it is simply to 
exercise the broad discretion that typically characterizes the 
employer-employee relationship. A challenge that one has been 
                                                     
F.3d 250, 260–61 (6th Cir. 2006); Neilson v. D’Angelis, 409 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2005); 
Levenstein v. Salafsky, 414 F.3d 767, 775–76 (7th Cir. 2005); Campagna v. Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Prot., 334 F.3d 150, 156 (1st Cir. 2003). 
169. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 609. 
170. Id. at 598. 
171. Id. at 601 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973) 
(Stewart, J., concurring)). 
172. Id. at 602. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 604. 
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treated individually in this context, instead of like everyone else, 
is a challenge to the underlying nature of the government 
action.175 
In other words, subjective and individualized decisions, which Chief 
Justice Roberts identified as within the exercise of broad discretion, 
simply cannot be cabined even by a requirement that they be rational. 
For this reason, the class-of-one theory is “a poor fit in the public 
employment context,” and the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that 
equal protection claims such as Engquist’s are not cognizable.176 “In 
such situations, allowing a challenge based on the arbitrary singling out 
of a particular person would undermine the very discretion that such 
state officials are entrusted to exercise.”177 
It is easy to imagine reading the Court’s holding in Engquist as a 
strategic decision, intended to keep the judiciary out of an area in which 
it would be extremely difficult for courts to vindicate the constitutional 
norm without undue interference in the functioning of the political 
branches. Without a “clear standard” to apply to personnel decisions, 
courts would find themselves simply second-guessing the executive or 
administrative officials who made the decisions on a discretionary basis 
in the first place, thereby “undermin[ing] the very discretion that such 
state officials are entrusted to exercise.”178 The point of Engquist, on this 
reading, would not be that government is constitutionally free to make 
employment decisions based on whim or animus toward an individual 
employee, but rather that given the difficulty of ascertaining or even 
articulating the basis for many such decisions, it is preferable for the 
courts to abstain. Such deliberate judicial underenforcement would leave 
implementation of the norm to the political branches, not decree that 
what would be an illegitimate basis for governmental action in any other 
circumstance is constitutionally acceptable in government personnel 
decisions. 
Footnote 27 of Heller, however, clearly rejects a strategic or doctrinal 
interpretation of Engquist. Rather, Justice Scalia’s view of Engquist in 
footnote 27 is also the more natural reading of Chief Justice Roberts’s 
opinion standing on its own.179 According to footnote 27, Engquist 
                                                     
175. Id. at 605. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 603. It is worth noting that the Court expressly reaffirmed the continuing viability of 
class-based claims about government employment decisions. Id. at 605. 
178. Id. at 603. 
179. There is language that could support a strategic understanding of Engquist, and without 
footnote 27 one might not be quite sure how to read the decision. See, for example, id. at 604, where 
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applied “the very substance of the equal protection guarantee”—a 
prohibition on “irrational laws”—in holding that the plaintiff’s 
allegations did not state an equal protection claim.180 Those allegations, 
in other words, did not describe a constitutionally cognizable form of 
irrational government action. That is, on its face, a surprising 
proposition.181 The plaintiff in Engquist alleged that “she was fired . . . 
for ‘arbitrary, vindictive and malicious reasons.’”182 In class-based equal 
protection cases, if the government’s purpose is to harm the disfavored 
group for such reasons, its action is invalid under rational-basis scrutiny, 
because that test asks whether the classification in question serves a 
legitimate governmental purpose, not simply some purpose.183 
Given the judicial willingness to entertain hypothetical and even 
implausible explanations for the government’s actions,184 it is very 
difficult in a rational-basis case for a plaintiff to prevail on a claim of 
governmental purpose-to-harm, but that is a difficulty of proof and does 
not affect the underlying constitutional norm. Furthermore, in light of 
Olech’s recognition of the class-of-one theory, which Engquist did not 
question, it seems implausible to assert that it can be a legitimate 
governmental purpose to single out an individual for harm for “arbitrary, 
vindictive, and malicious reasons” peculiar to that individual. Such a 
                                                     
the opinion’s reference to treating “seemingly similarly situated individuals differently in the 
employment context” at least allows the inference that the problem lies in the difficulty of judging 
decisions necessarily based in part on subjective or non-quantifiable factors (emphasis added). 
However, given the close temporal proximity between Engquist and Heller, and the fact that the two 
Justices joined one another’s opinions, there is no reason to think that Justice Scalia misunderstood 
the Chief Justice’s slightly earlier opinion. 
180. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008). 
181. It is, for constitutional purposes, immaterial in itself that Engquist involved an 
administrative decision rather than a law or other general rule. As the Chief Justice noted, 
administrators are just as surely governed by equal protection as legislators. 553 U.S. at 597. It is a 
familiar and very old feature of equal protection law, furthermore, that particular government 
decisions that violate the equal protection norm are unconstitutional even if the law under which 
they were taken is itself constitutional. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886). 
The Constitution demands that equal protection be afforded not only by the rule governing a public 
decision but by decision itself as well. 
182. 553 U.S. at 595 (quoting Joint Appendix at 10, Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 
591 (2008) (No. 07-474)). 
183. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973) (“[I]f the 
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least 
mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a 
legitimate governmental interest. As a result, ‘[a] purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in 
and of itself and without reference to [some independent] considerations in the public interest, 
justify [a government action].’” (second and third alterations and emphasis in original) (quoting 
Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 n.11 (D.D.C. 1972))). 
184. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955); supra Part IV.C. 
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purpose is indistinguishable from the invidious race- or gender-based 
animus that clearly is impermissible under equal protection.185 
Despite all this, Engquist held that, in the area of government 
employment, equal protection does not prohibit decisions that would be 
constitutionally impermissible elsewhere: the constitutional “rule that 
people should be ‘treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions’ 
is not violated when one person is treated differently from others” in the 
context of “an individualized, subjective personnel decision.”186 Such a 
decision cannot transgress the equal protection norm, even when it is, ex 
hypothesi, an “arbitrary or irrational” decision.187 Equal protection 
simply has no application to such decisions including those situations in 
which they are made “in a seemingly arbitrary or irrational manner.”188 
The unavoidable implication is that the Constitution puts no equal 
protection constraint on the power of government to “treat[] an 
employee differently from others for a bad reason, or for no reason at 
all,” at least if it does not make use of a group-based classification in 
doing so.189 
                                                     
185. The Court asserted in Olech that “the number of individuals in a class is immaterial for equal 
protection analysis.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 n.* (2000). In order to avoid 
the risk that recognizing the class-of-one theory would convert many garden-variety disputes over 
governmental decisions into constitutional cases (an overtly strategic reason), Justice Breyer 
thought it crucial that the plaintiff in Olech had alleged that the governmental defendants had acted 
out of “‘vindictive [motives],’ ‘illegitimate animus,’ or ‘ill will.’” Id. at 566 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(quoting Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998)). The Court declined to 
include that as a requirement to state a class-of-one claim, but it clearly accepted the plaintiff’s 
allegation along those lines as adequately alleging that the government had “no rational basis for the 
difference in treatment.” Olech, 528 U.S. at 564. 
186. 553 U.S. at 603, 605 (emphasis added) (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71–72 
(1887)). 
187. Id. at 605. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 606. The quoted language is the opinion’s summary of the at-will employment 
doctrine. The Chief Justice apparently assumed that a constitutional argument entailing modification 
of that common-law doctrine would be questionable on that ground alone. See id. (“The 
Constitution does not require repudiating that familiar doctrine.”). His assumption is puzzling. 
There is no plausible argument that the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment presuppose the 
doctrine’s application to government employees, because the doctrine did not become the general 
American rule until after 1868. See, e.g., Andrew P. Moriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and 
Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679, 699 (1994) 
(explaining that only three states adopted the doctrine before 1870 and none before 1808). The 
supposed “historical understanding of the nature of government employment,” Engquist, 553 U.S. at 
606, is an innovation post-dating the constitutional provision at issue. 
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B. Engquist Creates a Novel Definition of Irrationality 
This conclusion poses an immediate puzzle: Engquist apparently 
sanctions arbitrary or irrational personnel decisions as consistent with 
equal protection, while footnote 27 identifies the prohibition of 
“irrational laws” as the very substance of norms such as equal 
protection. If, as Chief Justice Roberts clearly affirms, the individual 
right to equal protection is offended by arbitrary or irrational 
treatment—which must mean arbitrary or irrational treatment of the 
individual—how can he also write that the Constitution permits 
government to make individual personnel decisions that are “seemingly 
arbitrary or irrational”? The Engquist opinion offers a hypothetical to 
address this puzzle:190 
Suppose, for example, that a traffic officer is stationed on a busy 
highway where people often drive above the speed limit, and 
there is no basis upon which to distinguish them. If the officer 
gives only one of those people a ticket, it may be good English 
to say that the officer has created a class of people that did not 
get speeding tickets, and a “class of one” that did. But assuming 
that it is in the nature of the particular government activity that 
not all speeders can be stopped and ticketed, complaining that 
one has been singled out for no reason does not invoke the fear 
of improper government classification. Such a complaint, rather, 
challenges the legitimacy of the underlying action itself-the 
decision to ticket speeders under such circumstances. Of course, 
an allegation that speeding tickets are given out on the basis of 
race or sex would state an equal protection claim, because such 
discriminatory classifications implicate basic equal protection 
concerns. But allowing an equal protection claim on the ground 
that a ticket was given to one person and not others, even if for 
no discernible or articulable reason, would be incompatible with 
the discretion inherent in the challenged action. It is no proper 
                                                     
190. The Engquist hypothetical is similar to a hypothetical Judge Posner used in a pre-Engquist 
Seventh Circuit case, Bell v. Duperrault:  
A police car is lurking on the shoulder of a highway in a 45 m.p.h. zone, a car streaks by at 65 
m.p.h., and the police do nothing. Two minutes later a car streaks by at 60 m.p.h. and the 
police give that driver a ticket. Is it a denial of equal protection if the police cannot come up 
with a rational explanation for why they ticketed the slower speeder?  
367 F.3d 703, 712 (2004) (Posner, J., concurring). Posner, like Justice Breyer in Olech, would limit 
class-of-one equal-protection claims to those in which the plaintiff alleges that the official action 
was “invidiously motivated,” which he later explained to mean an intentional act of “vicious or 
exploitative discrimination.” Id. 
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challenge to what in its nature is a subjective, individualized 
decision that it was subjective and individualized.191 
On its face, this hypothetical might seem to create more problems 
than it solves.192 What is the constitutional difference between being 
singled out for no reason and being singled out on the basis of race or 
sex? Why does the officer’s decision which driver to ticket allegedly on 
the basis of the driver’s race or sex probably violate equal protection, 
while his decision to do so allegedly out of personal animus (recognizing 
an old personal enemy, the officer decided to get even a little) raises no 
equal protection concerns at all?193 The Chief Justice’s frequent 
descriptions of the decisions in Engquist’s case and his traffic-officer 
hypothetical as “individualized,”194 paired with his references to the 
Court’s “traditional view of the core concern of the Equal Protection 
Clause as a shield against arbitrary classifications,”195 suggest one 
answer. Together, one might read these passages to imply that there is 
something especially problematic from an equal protection perspective 
about governmental thinking that uses conceptual groupings of people to 
make decisions. The only problem with this answer is that it cannot be 
what the Engquist opinion means if the opinion is to make good sense. 
There is no escape, in a governmental system based on the rule of 
law, from the use of classifications, and a great many possible 
classifications make perfectly good sense, even though they are applied 
                                                     
191. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 603–04. 
192. In dissent, Justice Stevens countered that under the circumstances hypothesized, the traffic 
officer’s decision to ticket a single driver would be perfectly rational: “His inability to arrest every 
driver in sight provides an adequate justification for making a random choice from a group of 
equally guilty and equally accessible violators. . . . [A] random choice among rational alternatives 
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 613. That seems correct, but I do not think it 
identifies the most fundamental problem with the Chief Justice’s argument. 
193. Proving a race- or sex-based invidious intention, in an isolated instance, might be just as 
difficult as proving personal animus (or even harder), and race and sex are no more, and no less, 
related to any reason for choosing which driver to pull over than a private history of enmity. Race, 
of course, is of special equal protection concern because of constitutional history, and one might 
think the same of sex, at least by analogy. But if that were the answer, the Chief Justice would have 
had no explanation why class-of-one claims are cognizable in cases such as Olech (where there is 
no historical or originalist argument for special solicitude), but not in Engquist. More generally, it 
would be quite possible to build an understanding of equal protection law as built on the originalist 
proposition that the paradigm case underlying the Fourteenth Amendment clause concerned 
discrimination against African Americans as a grouping of people. Equal protection would then 
apply to other discriminations by analogy and to the extent that the non-originalist situation is 
analogous. Engquist makes no use of any such argument. Nor does footnote 27. On the concept of 
the paradigm case, see JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 15–18, 120–24 (2005). 
194. See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 602–05. 
195. Id. at 598 (emphasis added). 
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to particular persons in particular situations. Neither the presence of a 
class larger than one in official decisionmaking, nor the fact that the 
decision bears on an individual, can in itself make any constitutional 
difference. A decision to fire a particular employee, or ticket a particular 
driver, because of her race or sex—either of which, Chief Justice 
Roberts affirms, would raise very serious equal protection concerns—is 
just as “individualized” as a decision to fire or ticket her for no reason or 
because of personal dislike. Of course, the use of a broad classification 
(e.g., African American or female) to make decisions about an 
individual may indicate or even prove that the decision in question fails 
to provide any good reason for treating the individual differently than 
others. However, the invidious use of race or sex does not make the 
decision any more irrational than reaching the same result for no reason 
or because the decisionmaker is acting out of personal ill will. If, as 
Engquist implies, the overarching concern of equal protection is 
irrationality—a governmental failure to act in a fashion that logically 
advances “‘[some independent] consideration[] in the public 
interest”196—race and sex as irrational motivations for governmental 
action are no different in kind from simple official ill will, even though 
they may be more frequent and the offenders more heinous. 
The difference between class-based decisions and other 
individualized decisions does not provide a conceptual justification for 
the distinction Engquist attempts to draw. Furthermore, the effort seems 
to fly in the face of existing constitutional understandings. It is settled 
law that the equal protection right belongs to individuals, not to 
groups.197 It is equally settled that a classification that serves no 
purpose—“a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake”198 as 
the Court has put it—or the illegitimate purpose of harming people has 
no rational basis.199 Olech, unquestioned in Engquist, established the law 
that it does not matter constitutionally how many people are affected 
negatively by a discriminatory decision.200 Assuming that the decision in 
Engquist does not upset one or more of these propositions, which the 
majority opinion denies it has done, the category of “improper 
government classifications” still encompasses those that have no 
                                                     
196. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973) (first alteration in original) 
(quoting Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 n.11 (D.D.C. 1972)). 
197. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (explaining that the 
Fourteenth Amendment “protect[s] persons, not groups” (emphasis in original)). 
198. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 
199. Id. at 634–35. 
200. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 n.* (2000). 
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purpose, those that have a well-known and established bad purpose 
(unjustified decisions based on race or sex), and those that have a bad 
purpose peculiar to the particular situation. The assertion that there is no 
equal protection issue in Engquist or in the traffic-officer hypothetical 
cannot rest on there being something unique about the substance of the 
governmental decision under either set of facts. There must be some 
other characteristic common to them that differentiates them 
constitutionally from Olech and from a claim of intentional race or sex 
discrimination. That differentiating characteristic evidently lies in 
another aspect of governmental decisionmaking as the majority 
understands it, although the opinion of the Court is not wholly explicit. 
Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly characterizes decisions such as those 
of Engquist’s superiors and of his hypothetical traffic officer as 
“subjective” and “discretionary.”201 “There are,” he remarks, “some 
forms of state action . . . which by their nature involve discretionary 
decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized 
assessments.”202 Where a decision “rest[s] on a wide array of factors that 
are difficult to articulate and quantify,”203 Roberts adds that “treating 
like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion 
granted. In such situations, allowing a challenge based on the arbitrary 
singling out of a particular person would undermine the very discretion 
that such state officials are entrusted to exercise.”204 Discretionary 
decisions of this kind differ entirely from governmental decisions that 
officials make in the presence of “a clear standard against which 
departures, even for a single plaintiff, could be readily assessed.”205 
Where the plaintiff claims that “the arbitrary singling out of a 
particular person”206 was based on race or sex, the reason that a 
constitutional challenge lies is because there is a clear standard 
applicable in that situation: except in extraordinary circumstances, 
government is not to discriminate on the basis of race or sex. Public 
action, in short, can be discretionary, or it can be governed by rules. If it 
is the latter, equal protection requires, at the least, a rational basis for 
treating one person different than others, but if the action is 
                                                     
201. See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 602–05. The Chief Justice also frequently describes them as 
“individualized,” but that seems to be a misstep in light of the individual nature of the equal 
protection right. 
202. Id. at 603. 
203. Id. at 604. 
204. Id. at 603. 
205. Id. at 602. 
206. Id. at 603. 
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discretionary, it is a matter of constitutional insignificance that the 
individual was singled out in a “seemingly arbitrary or irrational 
manner”207 or “for no discernible or articulable reason.”208 There is a 
domain of rule-governed official behavior and a domain where, as far as 
the Constitution is concerned, officials may do as they will. 
We can now see why Chief Justice Roberts concluded that Engquist 
had not stated an equal protection claim, in contrast to the plaintiff in 
Olech. Engquist’s class-of-one claim assailed a public decision within 
the realm of discretion and politics, and that realm lies by definition 
outside the orderly legal domain governed by equal protection. As noted 
earlier, in any given case it might be as difficult to prove that a public 
employee was fired or a driver ticketed on the basis of race or sex as it 
would be to prove the discriminatory treatment had no basis or was 
motivated by individual animus. Ferreting out bad motives is a tricky 
business, and we can grant, for the sake of argument, the Chief Justice’s 
claim that a well-motivated official might find it difficult to articulate 
just why he fired or ticketed X rather than Y.209 
But such difficulties do not exist when the question is whether the 
official acted intentionally on the basis of race or sex, or because he 
personally disliked his victim, or for no reason at all—and regardless of 
which of these it is.210 Such reasons are not among Chief Justice 
Roberts’s “vast array of subjective, individualized assessments” that we 
ordinarily think officials are “entrusted” to make and act upon.211 The 
official will know the truth of the matter whether any of them explain his 
action. He will know, to put it another way, if he acted in constitutional 
bad faith, on the basis of considerations that the Court has defined as 
illegitimate, which is true not just of race and sex but of malice and 
meaninglessness as well. It follows that if the constitutional norm that 
“people should be ‘treated alike, under like circumstances and 
conditions’ is not violated”212 when an official exercises his discretion 
regardless of whether he does so for a “good reason, bad reason, or no 
                                                     
207. Id. at 605. 
208. Id. at 604. 
209. The Engquist opinion seems to make more of the difficulty of explaining personnel 
decisions than is entirely plausible, particularly given the enormous amount of time and energy 
American public and private institutions expend attempting to regularize and explain such decisions. 
210. The question of officials’ unconscious motivations, while extremely interesting, is not 
generally relevant under existing constitutional law. 
211. See id. at 603. 
212. Id. (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1887)). 
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reason at all,”213 the only explanation can be that the norm is, from the 
official’s perspective, entirely external to his own thinking, not a basis 
on which he has a duty to guide his exercise of discretion. His liability to 
judicial correction if he acts on the basis of race or sex only confirms 
this: in those circumstances there is an external rule, externally enforced, 
that sets an outer bound to his domain of discretion. Within that domain, 
equal protection is silent. The Constitution’s apparent purpose of 
securing equal protection to all persons is as irrelevant to official 
discretion in such circumstances as the Internal Revenue Code’s purpose 
of securing revenue is to taxpayers who do not engage in tax evasion. 
Taxpayers have no duty of good faith to maximize the government’s 
goals, and political officials, after Engquist, apparently have no duty of 
good faith to make discretionary decisions conform to the Constitution’s 
goals. 
We have seen this line of reasoning before: Engquist’s account of 
discretion is isomorphic with footnote 27’s understanding of politics. It 
is easy to understand why Justice Scalia would join the opinion in 
Engquist and, even more to the point for present purposes, why he would 
cite it in Heller.214 The distinction Chief Justice Roberts draws there 
between official conduct that is subject to rules and public actions that 
are entirely a matter of the official’s will is central to Justice Scalia’s 
own jurisprudential thought.215 To be sure, the footnote’s “[s]ee, e.g.,” 
citation to Engquist, given in support of a statement about how “we have 
used” rational-basis scrutiny, glosses over the novelty of Engquist’s 
reasoning, and the extent to which Justice Scalia’s views are a 
                                                     
213. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 606 (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioner at 27, Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of 
Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (No. 07-474)). 
214. Footnote 27 provides a pinpoint citation to the section of the Engquist opinion that includes 
the traffic-officer hypothetical. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008) (citing 
Engquist, 553 U.S. at 603–04). There can be no real doubt that Justice Scalia intends the footnote to 
endorse the concept of constitutional irrationality that Engquist presents. 
215. Justice Scalia has sometimes expressed his jurisprudential preference for hard-edged rules as 
itself a strategic one, intended to restrain what he views as judicial overreaching and thus much like 
the New Deal Court’s reason for adopting rational basis. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. ___, 
130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223–24 (2010) (majority opinion of Scalia, J.) (explaining the prophylactic and 
administrative reasons for adopting a per se fourteen day rule governing when the potentially 
coercive effects of custody should be deemed abated); Scalia, supra note 153, at 1179–80 (“[W]hen, 
in writing for the majority of the Court, I adopt a general rule, and say, ‘This is the basis of our 
decision,’ I not only constrain lower courts, I constrain myself as well. If the next case should have 
such different facts that my political or policy preferences regarding the outcome are quite the 
opposite, I will be unable to indulge those preferences; I have committed myself to the governing 
principle. . . . Only by announcing rules do we hedge ourselves in.”). If so, there is a serious internal 
tension in his thinking on the whole subject, because footnote 27 and other entries in the Scalia 
oeuvre seem to reject a strategic approach categorically. 
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controversial and contestable position in contemporary legal debate 
rather than common wisdom.216 That is, of course, a common rhetorical 
strategy in doctrinally novel opinions, and not in constitutional law 
alone, but it should not mislead us into missing the radical nature of 
what Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts are proposing. 
C. The Understanding of Rationality in Engquist and Footnote 27 
Differs Radically from Its Traditional Meaning in Constitutional 
Law 
The Engquist opinion makes internal sense, but the Chief Justice has 
purchased coherence at the cost of moving dramatically away from 
traditional constitutional thought. The distinction between rule-governed 
and discretionary decisionmaking by the political branches is of course 
at least as old as Marbury v. Madison, but its historical role has been to 
demarcate those decisions where the courts may properly review the 
lawfulness of political action from those in which the law provides no 
justiciable standard of review.217 The point of talking about official 
discretion has not been that the officials should feel free to act 
whimsically, maliciously, or without regard to constitutional norms.218 
There is no reason to assume that all exercises of discretion, or even 
all those that involve the consideration of factors that are subjective or 
difficult to articulate, stand in the same relationship to constitutional 
norms: it is difficult to believe that a President making a cabinet 
nomination has the same duties under equal protection with respect to 
race and sex that Chief Justice Roberts’s traffic officer does in deciding 
whom to ticket. Official discretion, furthermore, has traditionally been 
understood to heighten, if anything, the official’s duty to act in good 
faith. As we have seen, however, Engquist must logically reject the 
possibility that there is any duty of good faith that can establish a legal 
norm relevant to personnel decisions or traffic citations. If there were, 
the distinction Chief Justice Roberts draws between the equal protection 
claim at issue in Engquist and the one in Olech (or a race or sex 
discrimination claim) would collapse.219 
                                                     
216. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. 
217. See Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, Marshall’s Questions, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 367, 
373 (1999). 
218. Cf. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 612 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is a clear distinction 
between an exercise of discretion and an arbitrary decision.”). 
219. As I argued earlier, there is no reason that the subjective and hard-to-articulate factors 
potentially involved in personnel decisions would make it any more difficult for officials to make 
personnel decisions consistently with a constitutional duty of good faith than it is for them to abide 
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What is at stake here is the very meaning of rationality—and its 
opposite—in constitutional law. Although the Constitution’s text does 
not demand, in so many words, that government act rationally, the 
dominant assumption has long been that irrational official decisions are 
inconsistent with the constitutional norms of due process and equal 
protection. Furthermore, both before and after the 1937 shift in 
constitutional doctrine, it was clear that the rationality necessary to 
affirm the validity of a law or other public action turns on the presence 
in official decisions of “‘[independent] considerations in the public 
interest,’”220 independent of sheer caprice or the desire to use public 
authority to pursue private or malicious ends.221 Before Engquist and 
Heller, therefore, constitutional irrationality was a concept 
encompassing more than the occasional case of a complete breakdown in 
official reasoning.222 The judicial rational-basis test, as the Court has 
consistently described it, reflects this underlying view of what the 
Constitution demands: the test requires not simply a logical connection 
between governmental action and governmental purpose, but the 
presence, at least as a matter of hypothesis, of a constitutionally 
permissible “legitimate” purpose. A law or other governmental action, 
on this view, is irrational for constitutional purposes not only when it is 
senseless, but also equally when it fails to meet a legal requirement of 
legitimacy in purpose. 
This requirement of legitimate purpose is logically independent of the 
extraordinarily deferential method by which cases such as Williamson 
enforce it. A court following Williamson would likely entertain any 
plausible legitimate purpose that will sustain the validity of the official 
action, ordinarily without regard to whether the purpose was in fact the 
ground for the decision. Unless the exercise is entirely a charade, 
however, even a hypothetical inquiry into purpose presupposes the 
                                                     
by the rules regarding race or sex—or any more difficult for courts to measure deviations from the 
duty. 
220. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 n.11 (D.D.C. 1972)). 
221. See, e.g., Bell v. Duperrault, 367 F.3d 703, 711 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J., concurring) 
(“[U]nequal treatment due solely to animus is a subset of irrational and arbitrary conduct.”). 
222. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 344 (1989) (applying 
rule that equal protection requires that “‘the selection or classification is neither capricious nor 
arbitrary, and rests upon some reasonable consideration of difference or policy’” (quoting Brown-
Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 573 (1919)); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 16 (1992) 
(explaining that “Allegheny Pittsburgh was the rare case where the facts precluded any plausible 
inference that the reason for the unequal [governmental] practice was to achieve the benefits of” a 
rational governmental policy). 
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normative requirement that government act for some legitimate 
reason.223 The admittedly rare cases in which a public action is held 
invalid because it actually was senseless or solely motivated by an 
impermissible purpose show as much.224 The Court’s employment of 
rational-basis scrutiny, before footnote 27 and Engquist, was 
confirmation that the Constitution demands of public decisions not 
merely logic but, equally, respect for an understanding (no doubt largely 
implicit) about what is legitimate and illegitimate to do in the exercise of 
official power. The baseline of the American constitutional order is a 
government that acts rationally, but not merely in the sense that it has 
reasons for what it does; rationality in traditional thought has also meant 
that government’s actions are undertaken in good faith and for reasons 
that are generally seen to be appropriate.225 
Footnote 27 and Engquist rest on a very different understanding of 
constitutional rationality. Engquist flatly denies that legitimacy in 
purpose or even any purpose at all is constitutionally required when the 
official action involves a discretionary decision of the sort Engquist 
classed as “subjective.” By citing Engquist to exemplify what the 
Constitution means by “irrational laws,” footnote 27 implies that 
Engquist’s reasoning is generalizable beyond the specifics of 
government employment. More particularly, in light of Engquist’s 
unavoidable rejection of a general duty to act in good faith for legitimate 
(or at least not for illegitimate) purposes, footnote 27’s invocation of 
Engquist suggests that there is no normative element to rationality. 
Generally, rationality and legitimacy have no necessary or essential 
                                                     
223. As we have seen, the Court has traditionally viewed Williamson’s indulgence in 
hypothesizing a form of deference to a legislature or other decisionmaker, see Williamson v. Lee 
Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955); Part IV.C, that itself is supposed to have determined, non-
hypothetically, that there are “[independent considerations] in the public interest” that support the 
decision. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–35 (alteration in original) (quoting Moreno, 345 F. Supp. at 314 
n.11). 
224. The Court described one of those cases as “[a]pplying the basic principles of rationality 
review” to invalidate a city ordinance because “the city’s purported justifications for the ordinance 
made no sense in light of how the city treated other groups similarly situated in relevant respects.” 
Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 n.4 (2001) (discussing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447–450 (1985)). 
225. Cf. Duperrault, 367 F.3d at 710 (Posner, J., concurring). Judge Posner explained that equal 
protection is violated if an official engages in discrimination for “‘reasons of a personal nature 
unrelated to the duties of the defendant’s position,’” id. (quoting Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 
F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000)), and that these reasons “go beyond personal hostility to the 
plaintiff (i.e., animus) . . . [and] larceny, . . . or a desire to find a scapegoat in order to avoid adverse 
publicity and the threat of a lawsuit . . . —improper motives for a public official (scapegoating is not 
a legitimate tactic of public officials any more than stealing is), but different from personal 
hostility.” Id. (citations omitted). 
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relationship in constitutional law. The irrational, as far as the 
Constitution is concerned, is that which makes no sense at all, and the 
Constitution permits governmental authority to be structured, at least 
much of the time, so as to license official actions undertaken for no 
reason or bad ones. There are, to be sure, constitutional rules forbidding 
certain specific governmental purposes but no general norm that 
government must have good reasons for acting. 
In one sense, Justice Scalia in footnote 27 and the Engquist Court 
agree with the great legal realist Felix Cohen, who wrote long ago that 
the rational-basis test “makes of our courts lunacy commissions sitting in 
judgment upon the mental capacity of legislators and, occasionally, of 
judicial brethren,”226 but Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts do not 
think this is a mistake due to the dominance of an arid legal 
conceptualism—”transcendental nonsense”—as Cohen saw it. The 
courts are lunacy commissions in rational-basis cases, Justice Scalia and 
Chief Justice Roberts imply, because lunacy is all that the underlying 
constitutional command prohibits. Even that prohibition, trivial as it 
surely is, has no application when the government is exercising what the 
Engquist Court calls “discretion,” for decisions that can be made for any 
reason or none cannot rightly be said to be crazy (or rational, for that 
matter); the very concept of rationality has no application.227 Perhaps 
there are other, non-constitutional modes of evaluation that can be 
applied in such circumstances, but the constitutional baseline makes no 
necessary demands that government follow either logic or legitimacy 
except insofar as it is subject to the external compulsion of judicial 
review. The irrational is, as a constitutional matter, perfectly thinkable. 
VII. FOOTNOTE 27 REWORKS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
LAW AND POLITICS ON THE ROBERTS COURT 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices and scholars interested in the Court talk 
endlessly about the relationship between constitutional law and politics. 
The Justices accuse one another of making political rather than properly 
legal decisions; some of the scholars attempt to prove that in fact all the 
                                                     
226. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 
809, 819 (1935). 
227. Recall that the conclusion in Engquist—never put so bluntly—was that Engquist’s superiors 
had not violated the Constitution regardless of what senseless or malicious factors led to her 
selection for discharge. See 553 U.S. at 595–96 (discussing Engquist’s claim, accepted by the jury, 
was that she was discharged for “arbitrary, vindictive or malicious reasons” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); id. at 606 (explaining that the Constitution does not prohibit government from 
“treat[ing] an employee differently from others for a bad reason, or for no reason at all”). 
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Justices play politics while others provide theories about how the Court 
can avoid politics and stick to law. Footnote 27, like any other serious 
assertion about constitutional law, has a location amid these debates.228 
Justice Scalia, as both a scholar and a judge, subscribes unequivocally 
to the proposition that the Court ought to steer clear of politics229—but 
then no Justice ever says the reverse. More interestingly, he believes that 
law and politics can be distinguished quite clearly, and that it is only 
willfulness or (self-)obfuscation that leads anyone to pretend 
otherwise.230 The Justices, he argues, can and ought to be “doing 
essentially lawyers’ work up here—reading text and discerning our 
society’s traditional understanding of that text,” and lawyers’ work, as 
he sees it, is an intellectual process of dealing with rules external to the 
lawyer’s own reason and judgment: “Texts and traditions are facts to 
study.”231 Law is a matter of the reasoned explication and 
implementation of values, to be sure,232 but they are values that others 
than the lawyer-as-judge dictate. Normative judgments about what 
values govern in the public sphere can only be the product of choice and 
will, not of reasoning in common, and as such they lie by definition 
beyond the competence of the lawyer-as-judge in a democracy.233 
“Value judgments, after all, should be voted on, not dictated”234 and 
                                                     
228. One can locate the footnote, and Justice Scalia’s views as a whole, in other debates as well. 
Jurisprudentially, for example, Scalia’s textualist approach to constitutional and statutory 
interpretation is usually seen as a form of legal positivism and/or formalism. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, 
Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1150 (1999) (distinguishing Justice 
Scalia’s formalism from legal positivism); George Kannar, Comment, The Constitutional Catechism 
of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1307 (1990) (classing Justice Scalia as both a positivist and a 
formalist). 
229. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603–04 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(distinguishing actions that are “within the range of traditional democratic action” as “judgments are 
to be made by the people” rather than the Court); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 
U. CIN. L.REV. 849, 863 (1989) (endorsing originalism in constitutional law because it alleviates the 
problem a judge will have distinguishing “those political values that he personally thinks most 
important, and those political values that are ‘fundamental to our society’”); Antonin Scalia, A 
Tribute to Chief Judge Richard Arnold, 58 ARK. L. REV. 541, 542 (2005) (praising Judge Arnold for 
Arnold’s rejection of the view that “‘judges are just politicians in another guise’”). 
230. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 981 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Court does not wish to be fettered by any such limitations on 
its preferences.”); id. at 1000–01. 
231. Id. at 1000. 
232. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (“[L]aw 
pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.”). 
233. Justice Scalia’s trademark opposition to the judicial use of legislative history, a matter on 
which I believe that he is largely correct, is also rooted in part in his conviction that value judgments 
are not, in the end, amenable to reasoned debate. 
234. Casey, 503 U.S. at 1001. 
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therefore it is in politics that the function of “making value judgments” 
must rest.235 That is true if one understands democracy to entail the 
principle that anything requiring a normative judgment “should be voted 
on”236 because such decisions can never be determined by “reasoned 
judgment,” but must always be choices that express “only personal 
predilection.”237 Footnote 27 embodies that understanding: the idea that 
men and women can reason in secular society about the normative is for 
Justice Scalia a pernicious fantasy. 
In the world of footnote 27, constitutional law ratifies this 
subordination of legal reason to political will. Constitutional review by 
the courts is limited to the enforcement of specific constitutional value 
judgments, which are themselves the product of political choice by the 
people (the highest political decisionmaker). Beyond the scope of 
whatever clear rules the people have chosen to mandate, public decisions 
are simply public choices, and the Court should not pretend otherwise, 
or suggest the existence of constitutional obligations that cannot be 
reduced to such rules.238 For Justice Scalia, the idea that the Constitution 
requires public decisions to be rational (or reasonable) in the traditional 
sense, involving as it does judgments about the legitimate ends of public 
action, makes no sense. Footnote 27 accordingly rejects the traditional 
understanding of rational-basis scrutiny, but its full implications go 
much further. Rationality as a normative requirement has been a feature 
of American constitutional law from the beginning, in large measure 
because the early Republic created constitutional law in the image, and 
using the tools, of the common law. The Court’s self-conscious creation 
and application of doctrine reflects constitutional law’s inheritance of 
the common law’s robust confidence in the meaningfulness of reasoned 
legal debate over normative issues. Because Justice Scalia believes that 
confidence is misplaced, he unsurprisingly rejects, at least in principle, 
much of the common law structure of constitutional law as a whole. 
                                                     
235. Id. at 1000. 
236. Id. at 1001. 
237. Id. at 984. Cf. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 
(1989) (“[T]he main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution—or, for that matter, in 
judicial interpretation of any law—is that the judges will mistake their own predilections for the 
law.”). 
238. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) 
(“[J]udicial action must be governed by standard, by rule” whereas “[l]aws promulgated by the 
Legislative Branch can be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc . . . .” (emphasis in original)); Michael 
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J., announcing the judgment of the 
Court) (“[A] rule of law that binds neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable tradition is no 
rule of law at all.”). 
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Justice Scalia is, of course, only one person on the nine-member 
Court. But there are good reasons to think that in footnote 27 he has 
given us an important clue to the future direction of the Roberts Court as 
an institution. Justice Scalia’s energy and his strong convictions about 
constitutional theory have long made him one of the intellectual driving 
forces on the Court: a recent biography observed that “Scalia might be at 
the apex of his influence[, w]ith conservatives holding the balance of 
power, and still being among the younger members of the nine . . . .”239 
Footnote 27 cited, and on examination is of a piece with, Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinion in the little-remarked Engquist decision, suggesting a 
deep congruity between Justice Scalia’s views and Chief Justice 
Roberts’. Roberts is a notoriously skillful Chief Justice,240 and Justice 
Holmes pointed out long ago that it is “little decisions which the 
common run of selectors would pass by” that often “have in them the 
germ of some wider theory, and therefore of some profound interstitial 
change in the very tissue of the law.”241 Justice Scalia’s footnote and 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion contain between them just such a wider 
theory, and that theory seems reflected once again in the exchange 
between Justices Alito and Breyer in McDonald, where Alito denied and 
Breyer embraced a broader normative role for judges in constitutional 
decisions.242 Nor was McDonald the only indication from the Court’s 
October Term 2009 that the footnote 27 understanding of constitutional 
irrationality commands the allegiance of at least a plurality of the 
Justices.243 Should a majority of Justices adopt this view, that would 
indeed work a profound change in the tissue of constitutional law. 
                                                     
239. JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 364 (2009). 
240. See Adam Liptak, The Most Conservative Court in Decades, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at 
18 (“Chief Justice Roberts is certainly widely viewed as a canny tactician.”). 
241. Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Marshall (Feb. 4, 1901), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
JUSTICE HOLMES 500, 501 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995). 
242. See supra Part I. 
243. See the debate between Justices Scalia and Kennedy in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. 
v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S.___, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2604–08, 2613–18 (2010). Justice 
Kennedy argued that the Court should not reach the question whether a judicial decision can effect a 
taking of property within the meaning of the takings clause, in part because substantive due process 
principles already render invalid judicial decisions that are “‘arbitrary or irrational.’” Id. at 2615 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005)). 
Justice Kennedy took this concept to include considerations of the “‘legitimacy’ of . . . the court’s 
judgment” and its effect on the reasonable expectations of the property-holder. Id. at 2614 (quoting 
E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998)). Justice Scalia responded that this understanding of 
substantive due process is “such a wonderfully malleable concept” that “even a firm commitment to 
apply it would be a firm commitment to nothing in particular.” Id. at 2608. 
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CONCLUSION 
Footnote 27 in District of Columbia v. Heller opens a window onto a 
brave new world of constitutional realism in which it is irrationality 
rather than reason that lies at the heart of our constitutional order. In that 
world there are constitutional rules, and where they apply, judges can 
enforce them even as to political actors. And there is the exercise of 
discretionary political power, with which judges cannot meddle in the 
Constitution’s name even if the power is exercised in ways that 
contravene the Constitution’s norms. Mystifications—transcendental 
nonsense—such as reasoned judgment and good faith are to be swept 
aside. The footnote’s world is brilliantly lit, with razor-sharp edges 
between light and darkness, sense and nonsense. It is also a cold world, 
and (for this author at any rate) a little frightening. 
 
